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
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# **The truth about Upper Silesia.**

A speech made in the Polish Diet on January 28<sup>th</sup> 1921,  
by Deputy A. Wierzbicki.

A resolution was passed by the Diet to publish this  
speech at the expense of the nation.

Warsaw,  
Published by the Diet of the Polish Republic.  
1921.



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## The Speaker's Preface.

The plebiscite, which is to decide the fate of Upper Silesia, whether it is to belong to Poland or to Germany, is approaching. At such a moment as this, the truth about Upper Silesia must be known. That truth was proclaimed in the Diet on January 28<sup>th</sup> 1921, by Deputy A. Wierzbicki in a speech of such importance that the Diet passed a resolution ordering it to be published at the expense of the State.

It is not sufficient to tell the truth: that truth must be proved. Therefore copies of all the documents and the data upon which Deputy Wierzbicki based his speech are given in the second part of this publication. These documents and data were composed and worked out before and during the war, principally by the Germans themselves.

*Trąpczyński.*

Speaker.

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**Speech by Deputy A. Wierzbicki.**



## THE ACTUAL PROBLEM OF UPPER SILESIA.

We have heard the interpellation and the Government's reply concerning certain factors in the struggle now taking place for Upper Silesia. But the plebiscite and its result is only one of the stages. The actual problem lies much deeper and upon the solution of that problem and upon its explanation to the widest circles of public opinion in the world will depend the final result of the plebiscite and the attitude towards the plebiscite of those Powers which can say the last word in the question. The Upper Silesian question, arose from two, equally important factors. One factor was the living Silesian people the realization of President Wilson's principles which do not take the historical past as the criterion for new political frontiers, but would have certainty as to the will of the people, of that living feeling of a people which had been in the possession of another state, and which is to be united into one national entity with its mother-nation.

Polish diplomacy, represented at the time of the publication of Wilson's manifest by the National Committee in Paris, understood these great principles, this great spirit of the epoch, and set up the thesis that Poland's frontiers should not be fixed according to the historical past — the frontiers of the Commonwealth in 1771. It understood that under the new circumstances these frontiers could not stand. And therefore the representatives of Poland, whilst not denying the importance of historical facts, put forward the ethnographical principle: the Polish character of the population of the territory which was to return to its mother-country. And thanks to that the Upper Silesian problem arose in all its strength and came forward so firmly that no hostile or unfavourable factors were able to expel it from the Council Room of the Versailles Conference or to lessen its importance at the definitive moment which is now approaching.

But the one principle of nationality is not enough to defend Upper Silesia. Above it it there rises more and more obstinately, and more and more powerfully, the second factor in the problem, the economic factor, and it is becoming so overwhelming, so dominating, as to make it quite certain that it will finally decide the whole question. Therefore the Upper Silesian question is being decided to-day not only by our preparations for the plebiscite. It is coming up every moment when, on one side or the other of the Channel, the ambassadors and pre-

miers assemble to take counsel, and when there appears on the order of the day the question of the solvency of the German Federation, the question of compensation for the war and of the disarmament of Germany.

At every such moment the Germans strive, with all possible emphasis and with a whole arsenal of arguments to unite the decision in these questions, in which the whole of western Europe and especially France is interested, into one indivisible whole with the Upper Silesian question. The Germans are continually putting before the Allied Powers the tantalising dilemma: Leave us Upper Silesia and all these questions will be otherwise settled. But if Upper Silesia is not to belong to the Prussian State or to the German Federation we shall be bankrupts, we shall not be able to recover economically or to fulfil the obligations which the treaty of Versailles lays upon us. It is from that point of view that the opinion of the whole German nation and of its leading statesmen treats the Upper Silesian question, and it was by laying emphasis upon this point that the German delegation advanced the problem of the German possession of Upper Silesia into the foreground during the Versailles Conference. The Germans were prepared to make concessions on any other question if only they were allowed to keep Upper Silesia for themselves.

#### UPPER SILESIA AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE IN PARIS.

I shall recall to your memories the moment when the news came to Germany that Upper Silesia had been definitely assigned to Poland and that the paragraphs embodying this decision had been inserted in the Peace Treaty, paragraphs drawn up in a completely logical manner. Then Germany exerted all her energy to get this point especially changed in the preliminary draft of the treaty. In their "Remarks on the Conditions of Peace", the German Delegates attached the utmost importance to the Upper Silesian question. Then Clemenceau wavered — meeting with Lloyd George's strong opposition and the Allied Powers put off the final settlement of the problem of Upper Silesia.

The Germans assert in their memorial that the majority of the population of Upper Silesia is not Polish — that at the elections only a third part of the population voted for the Poles and two thirds for the Germans. The Allies replied: "You are contradicting yourselves, because all the German authorities assert, and we read in all the German school books that the population of Upper Silesia is, in an immense and overwhelming mass, is Polish and not German. But as you say that it is not so, that the Silesian population does not wish to belong to Poland, let that population itself declare its will let there be a popular referendum in Silesia". The Germans further stated that without the Upper Silesian coal they would be bankrupt and would be unable to pay compensation for the war. Then concessions were made them in this particular also, the Allies deciding that in regard to the Upper Silesian coal the Germans should have privileges for purchasing that coal on the same principles and foundations as the citizens of the Polish State.

It seemed that the answer of the Allies only postponed the settlement of the Silesian question, but that the question was finally decided in favour of Poland, and that in a few months, or at most a year, the whole thing would be definitely settled.

## GERMAN PROPAGANDA.

But from the very moment when the Germans signed the Treaty of Versailles they began to fight to get Upper Silesia for themselves. They tried first of all for a delay, so as to gain time, and so as to wait for some new, and more convenient political conjuncture than the moment when they signed the Treaty of Versailles. A number of conferences took place, at which the Upper Silesian question was continually being connected with the question of paying compensation for the war to the Allies. The Germans wronged and injured in many ways the People of Upper Silesia so as to demoralize the local population, so as to make it feel the frightfulness of the German State and by those proved means of frightfulness and terror to cramp the freedom of declaration of the citizens of Upper Silesia and so to keep them within the German State. The systematic deception of the intellects of the whole world as to the Upper Silesian question was begun, on a large scale. Finally, in recent times a murderous attack was made upon the Polish mark so as to discredit the financial state of Poland in the eyes of the local population.

## MR. KEYNES' BOOK.

This propaganda, this deception of intellects actually yielded excellent fruit. A book appeared by Keynes, an eminent English economist, Secretary to the Royal Economic Institute in London, the author of a well-known work on India, that pearl of the English crown, that land which is a beloved subject of study to the English. Through such studies a man may win himself name and fame.

Keynes' book appeared, the book of a man who for six months took part in the Paris Congress, and, who was, in economic affairs, the most confidential adviser of Lloyd George. The book attempted to solve, among a number of others, the Upper Silesian question, the question of coal, the question of ore, the question of the plebiscite, and all this on a highly humanitarian basis. Keynes' thesis is that a new political world cannot be built up without the economic rebuilding of the whole of Europe, including Germany, and this thesis leads him to the idea of the revision of the treaty, of showing statesmen that they ought to take advantage, in a certain definite direction, of all the clauses of the treaty which were not definitively formulated at the Paris conference, and which postpone any question such as a plebiscite, or which fix temporary rates, as in the question of war compensation.

## KEYNES ON THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF UPPER SILESIA.

And behold, the whole world began to repeat after Keynes that the Germans could not stand without Upper Silesia, that Poland did not need Upper Silesia, that Upper Silesia supplied Poland before the war only with an insignificant amount of coal, that of the 43,000,000 of tons of coal produced in Upper Silesia only a million and a half went to Poland, that only 10,000,000 tons of coal was used in Poland and hence that it was a country which was economically undeveloped, which could not take due advantage of these immeasurable treasures which exist in Upper Silesia.

And if the German Federation were deprived of Upper Silesia it would not be able to fulfil the obligations which it undertook at Versailles, in regard to supplying coal to the Allies.

And that is the centre of gravity, for the Allies, beginning with France and Belgium and ending with Italy, besides a whole series of neutral states, must use either English or German coal so as to carry on their economic existence. Thus Keynes strikes a very sensitive string when he asserts that when Upper Silesia is taken away from them the Germans, will not be able to give the Allies coal, for, after the claims of the Allies had been satisfied there would remain only 55% of the coal which is necessary to Germany for her own use. Thus Keynes asserts that by decreasing from 100% to 55% their internal use of coal, the Germans would become an economically dead body and would not only not be able to fulfil their own obligations but would be a factor in the economic catastrophe of the whole of Europe.

And further, Keynes casts an immeasurable, dazzling light upon the constitution of economic relations, which is something so strictly connected with the soil, the geology and the physiography of countries, that economic organisms which have once been formed cannot, by an artificial political frontier, be transformed into other political bodies. If this is done there arises such confusion in the economic sphere that the new arrangement of political affairs will not make up for it for it will lead to a general economic catastrophe. And in consequence of the economic catastrophe there will come a social catastrophe and when these two catastrophes unite, no state can resist them and there will arise such an unheard of chaos as we have a foretaste of, in the east.

There is no doubt that when Keynes put the question in such a way, it was bound to bring immense pressure to bear upon the decisive economic factors, upon the best-informed statesmen, for Keynes, the authority, the important person, Lloyd George's councillor said it!

Now Keynes, defending his thesis, asserted that, by the cutting off from Germany of Alsace and Lorraine and by the separation of Upper Silesia, the mutual exchange between the beds of ore which exist in Lorraine and the beds of coal which exist in Upper Silesia would be disturbed. The homogenous German organism would be dismembered and would not be able to perform its functions.

France, regaining Alsace and Lorraine, will not, according to Keynes, have enough coal to get iron from the ore in the mines of Lorraine and Upper Silesia will be deprived of the iron ore which, Keynes says it derived from Lorraine and thus and thus its metallurgic industry will decay, the industry which is decisive for its economic power.

### KEYNES ON THE PLEBISCITE IN UPPER SILESIA.

Prejudiced in such a manner Keynes comes to the question of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia. But the idea of the importance of the will of a living nation is so powerful and so undisputed that even Keynes, who makes everything submit to the economic question, has to bow before that idea. •

And he says that the resolution of the treaty with regard to the plebiscite ought to be respected; but simultaneously he asserts that the Great Powers

ought to take advantage of the reservations contained in that resolution, to the effect that besides the will of the population as to the fate of Upper Silesia, its geographical and economic situation must also decide. Hence, according to Keynes, the Great Powers ought to recognize that, for geographical and economic reasons Upper Silesia ought to remain with Germany — unless the will of the population is distinctly contrary to it. Keynes hence foretells that if the collective vote of the Silesian population for Poland should not be powerful and elemental like an avalanche, which whirls down and shows the world the actual will of Silesia—then factors of an economic nature may, contrary to the plebiscite decide against the union of Upper Silesia to Poland. And with this prophecy of Keynes is connected Germany's plebiscite policy. Because of that, the Germans are bringing in hosts of those "Upper Silesians" who for from fifteen to forty years have been living in other, richer parts of Germany, who have broken their material and moral connection with Silesia, who have not there either relatives nor work, who have, as Germans, become part of the population of the native provinces of their country.

And thus hosts of such pseudo Upper Silesians are now rushing to Silesia so as to hinder that avalanche of Polish votes, so as not to permit of such a categorical results of the plebiscite that Keynes would be forced to make his economic conceptions submit to it. Thus we see that these things are not chance happenings, they are well thought out proceedings. And if we examine the whole set of diplomatic actions, notes and economic literature, we shall see that every step made by the Germans has been thought out and that every step leads towards a definite end — to lead the opinion of the whole of Europe astray and, contrary of the actual economic facts, to keep Upper Silesia and not to return it to Poland. The Germans take advantage of every conference, of every conflict of interests among the Allies, to throw Upper Silesia between them as a bone of contention — as a platform upon which their differences of opinion may be most easily reconciled at the cost of Poland. And therefore it is the highest time to show up that illusion, that forgery which the Germans have committed consciously and which they have contrived to propagate so skilfully, with such a great expenditure of material and moral means that even impartial statesmen, to the number of whom, it would seem, Keynes ought to belong, have bowed before that force of propaganda.

### KEYNES' MISTAKES — HOW TO DISCOVER THEM.

We know already what a picture Keynes showed in his book and what conclusions he imposed upon the opinion of the world and upon statesmen. Let us now examine the sources from which he drew his material and let us test his conclusions. And we shall test his conclusions not by fundamental Polish data, we shall found our conclusions exclusively on German works or upon data which have the sanction of the International Commission. We shall see how Keynes' work looks after this criticism — this work of his which was written not "pro Germania" but "pro Europa" as the German translators say in their preface, bowing to the author who wishes to save the whole of Europe from economic ruin. We shall see whence come those figures with which Keynes has magnetised the whole world and with which he has turned its opinion against us.

The first source which we shall use for our criticism is a certain German monograph. There was as yet no idea of the war when, as a memorial of the XII Pan-German Mining Congress at Breslau, the Upper Silesian Union of Miners and Foundrymen published an epoch-making work - a monograph on Upper Silesian industries. In this work all the branches of the Mining and Foundry Industry in Upper Silesia are subjected to detailed examination, complete statistics are given, an analysis is made of the ailments of Upper Silesia, of the hindrances to its development and an effort is made to discover upon what its future may be founded. That was before the Conference of Versailles, it was in the year 1913.

Besides this we have the secret memorials of the economic organizations of Upper Silesia which were presented during the great war to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and in which the Upper Silesian question is subjected to a detailed analysis <sup>1)</sup>. Copies of this memorial in an edition marked "streng vertraulich" (very confidential) and sealed with an official seal, were found by our Government in the archives of the Mining Office at Czenstochowa after the Germans left.

Then, concerning the coal department, we have the reports of the International Coal Commission at Ostrow, under the control of which the mining and dividing of the coal is done in Upper Silesia and in which a Pole also takes part. The work of the representative of the Polish Government, M. Kramsztyk, entitled "The Economic Union of Upper Silesia with Poland and with Germany" is based upon these reports.

Thus we have sources which are either exclusively German or are controlled by the International Commission. Partiality for us is hence impossible in these works, and yet they also categorically unmask German perfidy and the glaring mistakes which Keynes made in his book.

### COAL. KEYNES' FIRST MISTAKE, DUE TO THE FACT THAT HE RELIED TOO ABSOLUTELY UPON GERMAN STATISTICS.

Thus we see in Kramsztyk's work that this representative of the Polish Government, when he came across Keynes' statement, that Poland within its present boundaries used, in 1913, only 10<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> millions of tons of coal, wondered where Keynes' got that number for the correct figure is not 10<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> millions of tons but 19<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> millions, or nearly twice as much. In the same way the representative of the Polish Government does not understand why Keynes asserts that Poland imported only 1<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> millions of tons annually from Upper Silesia, whereas in reality the inhabitants of the present Polish territory used in 1913 not 1<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> millions of tons but 7 million 853 thousand or 5 times as much.

Thus Keynes in one case lessened the correct figures twice over and in the other 5 times. These are not small mistakes, they are not fractions, but amount to a complete twisting of the facts, to a complete falsifying of the reality of the economic problem. The representative of the Polish Government asserts this, but he cannot explain whence Keynes took these false figures. We can explain that matter.

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<sup>1)</sup> Das Interesse Oberschlesiens [an der Zukunft Polens. Ueberreicht durch die Handelskammer für den Regierungsbezirk Oppeln in Oppeln.

I have here the authorized translation of Keynes' work and I have here also our fourth source of information, the memorial of the German delegation presented to the Allies in reply to the propositions of the treaty. This memorial is called "Bemerkungen der deutschen Delegation zu den Friedensbedingungen" (Remarks of the German delegation on the conditions of peace).

Upon comparing Keynes' work with this memorial we discover that Keynes' translators, in the paragraphs concerned with Upper Silesian coal, had not even to trouble themselves to translate, for these paragraphs are taken whole out of the above-mentioned memorial of the German delegation. It is in that memorial that we find the figure of  $10\frac{1}{2}$  millions of tons as the amount used by Poland and there also we find the second figure of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  millions of tons as the amount of coal imported by Poland from Upper Silesia, Keynes wrote these paragraphs and those figures, uncritically, into his work and by means of them, magnetized Europe. Thus it is not Keynes who is speaking, it is the German delegation speaking through him. This is a thing which must be known. The authority and importance of this House cannot permit that, at the moment when the fates of Upper Silesia and Poland are in the balance, the whole world should repeat these falsehoods upon which the impartial and "pro Europa" English statesman built his conclusions.

Hence it is high time that, in the highest place in Poland, words of truth should be spoken aloud, branding this economic falsehood and showing that our struggle for Upper Silesia is a struggle for our rights.

For if we feel, all of us all over the world, the power of propaganda and if we see that even false propaganda can conquer the world, then what might be the power of that propaganda if it had real truth behind it! If conclusions drawn contrary to the obvious truth and founded upon false data can win over the opinion of the world, what opinion could resist the force of propaganda based on truth? The need for that truth is so great that people must dress up every one of their delusions in an appearance of truth, must colour them, must hang them on to some ideal, to some great thought or conception, for, without those colours and appearances the delusion would not pass for truth. How much stronger, then, is Poland's position which is supported by real truth and need not be bolstered up by any appearances! If we are able to assert and to prove that Keynes' conclusions are based upon complete and categorical falsehood, if, instead of that falsehood we give the world the actual truth, the economic arguments will prove to be, not for the Germans but for us, and, that being so, Upper Silesia must be restored to us.

Let us continue to criticise Keynes' work on the basis of German authorities or of works authorized by the International Commission and we shall see that not one word will remain, either of the German Delegation's memorial or of Keynes' book, which has not been proved to be false, we shall see that the reality is something quite different from what these two works represent it to be.

## WHICH HAS THE GREATER NEED OF THE COAL FROM UPPER SILESIA — POLAND OR GERMANY?

If we remain a while longer in the coal department, what do we see? Let us take the year 1913, the last year of economic prosperity for the whole world, and

coal used in that year from Upper Silesia. Silesia had, then, to cover 40% of Poland's demand, whilst German territory received from Silesia within the same period only 9% of the total amount of coal it consumed. Hence I ask which is the natural market for the surplus Upper Silesian coal, Germany, which could only take 9% of the amount it consumed from Silesia, or Poland which was obliged, in the year 1913, to cover as much as 40% of its demands ( $4\frac{1}{2}$  times more than Germany), with Silesian coal? This means that Poland is  $4\frac{1}{2}$  times more interested in the Upper Silesian coal field than Germany is.

If, hence, European statesmen are wringing their hands over the fate of the Germans if they are deprived of a supplement amounting to 9% of what they consume, what will be Poland's fate if she finds herself to be minus not 9% but 40% of the amount she needs? How completely are the facts reversed as to the economic importance of the Upper Silesian coal field for Poland and for Germany.

If Upper Silesia be joined to Poland, that means, if Poland and Silesia come to form one whole, the Upper Silesian coal will constitute, in accordance with the calculations for the year 1913, 66% of the total amount of coal consumed in Poland. But should Upper Silesia be joined to Germany, the total of Germany's consumption of Upper Silesian coal would be not 66% but 17%, so that, in this respect, the value of Upper Silesia for Poland, as regards coal, is four times greater than its value for Germany.

## HOW MINING IN UPPER SILESIA DEVELOPED UNDER THE GERMANS.

Let us now proceed to examine the question of the development of coal mining in Upper Silesia compared with coal mining in other coal districts of Germany, and let us remember that, in industry, as in life, he who cannot keep up with others is doomed to death and ruin.

Now we see that, between the years 1871 and 1911 the mining of coal in Upper Silesia increased only  $5\frac{1}{2}$  times over whereas in Dortmund the mining of coal increased seven times over. Thus the purely German coal districts advanced quicker and this explains why the Silesian German forsook his birthplace and moved to Westphalia, for there coal mining developed better and the soul of the Upper Silesian German has no kindred with the Polish population of Upper Silesia, so that it is easy for him to forsake that territory and settle in a native German district. Hence that emigration showed that under German dominion Upper Silesia was tottering to its fall and, that it could not keep up with the development of other coal fields.

And now let us investigate one more thing of immeasurably great importance, that is how this Upper Silesian coal, in the course of years, supplied German territory? We shall see that in Berlin the use of English coal increased eight times over between the years 1890 and 1911, the use of Westphalian coal increased three times over and the use of the Upper Silesian coal went back by a quarter, within the same period. Where, then, is the importance of the Upper Silesian coal field for Germany when even the capital of the state, which is situated within the sphere of the economic influence of Upper Silesia, used less and less of Upper Silesian coal? And if we wish to see what Upper Silesia was for Poland already before the war, in spite of the fiscal barrier which existed between them, we shall see that within the same period of time in which Berlin's consumption of Upper Silesian coal decreased 25%,

the consumption of that same coal in Poznań was three times multiplied, in Galicia, seven times, and in Congress Poland seven times also.

Hence again I ask whither did Germany send the Upper Silesian coal in peace time when the German Federation had Upper Silesia under its undivided rule? Whither did that coal go? To the capital of the Federation, Berlin? No, for English and Westphalian coal replaced it there, there the market for the Upper Silesian coal decreased, so it must have been sent somewhere. It must have been sent to Poland. The consumption of Upper Silesian coal in Berlin decreased by 25% and the consumption of the same article in Poland multiplied seven times over, or increased by 600%. This is the answer to the question to whom the Silesian coal is the most necessary.

### HOW MUCH COAL WILL THE GERMANS HAVE WITHOUT UPPER SILESIA? KEYNES' SECOND MISTAKE.

How does the heart of the question, the pretended serious position of Germany, which, after the separation of Upper Silesia was supposed to be left with only 55% of the amount of coal necessary for her life, look now? Keynes puts the case that way and yet the work of the representative of the Polish government, which work is based upon the data of the International Coal Commission, asserts that the Germans will have not 55% but 86% of what coal they need secured to them without Silesia, even if the mining of coal in the German coal fields did not reach its pre-war rate of production, but remained, as it does to-day at 78% of that rate.

Why did Keynes make that mistake? Why did he estimate the resources of Germany at such a low figure? Because he did not take into consideration in the first place the mining of lignite (bituminous wood) which is more abundant in Germany than in any other country.

Keynes passes over this matter with the remark that there are experts who assert that the lignite might very well make up to Germany for her deficit in pit coal. It never comes into Keynes' head to estimate the importance of the lignite or its amount. And yet if we count according to its value in pit coal, reckoning according to the rate accepted by the German experts in the Ostrawa Coal Commission, we see that the lignite (bituminous wood) gives Germany an enormous supplementary supply, equal to 30,000,000 of tons of pit coal. But Keynes passes this over, nor does he take into consideration the fact that Upper Silesia already to-day, as the result of the order of, and under the control of the International Commission gives the Germans 1,000,000 of tons of coal monthly or 12,000,000 annually. Besides Keynes reckons at 40,000,000 of tons the amount of coal which the Germans have pledged themselves by the Treaty of Versailles to deliver to the Allies. This amount was not, however, realized, for in June 1920 the International Conference at Spa fixed the amount which the Germans were obliged to deliver at 2,000,000 of tons monthly or 24,000,000 of tons annually. Such a condition of things was to exist until the end of January and then the contingent was to be raised insignificantly. Altogether, thus Keynes has diverged from the actual figures by 58,000,000 of tons, and that is how he got his figures showing that the Germans, without Upper Silesia would only have 55% of the coal they needed. The real state of things is totally different and therefore at the present moment German industries are flourishing, German export

is developing and the rate of exchange of the German mark is improving, whilst Polish industries are dwindling because Poland has not 40% or even 30% of the necessary coal at its disposal.

This is our answer to the coal problem as it is put by the German Delegation and by Keynes' book.

## WHENCE DO THE FOUNDRIES OF UPPER SILESIA OBTAIN ORE?

Let us now turn to the second thesis upheld by Keynes — that is to say the supposed economic dependance of Silesia on Alsace and Lorraine. Keynes, as we have seen, asserts that the Upper Silesian foundries lived on ore from Lorraine and that the incorporation of these two provinces into two separate state organisms would cause the ruin of Upper Silesian foundry work, which would have too little ore, and of Lorraine foundry work which France would not be able to supply with sufficient coal. But what have figures to say on this question?

The statistics of the development of Silesian foundry work show at the beginning it based its existence upon its own ore. In the year 1890 more than 80% of the ore used by the foundries of Upper Silesia was taken from the local mines, but this supply was too quickly exhausted. In the year 1913 the Silesian mines only yielded  $\frac{1}{6}$  the amount which they had produced in 1890, and in the year 1919 only  $\frac{1}{13}$ ; Silesia only received a poor 60,000 tons of its own ore. And whilst in 1890 Upper Silesian ore gave Silesia 80% of the material for its great furnaces to work on, in 1911 this percentage fell to 22%. Whence, then, did the Silesian foundries derive the ore that was wanting—was it from Lorraine? Nothing of the kind. 64% of the ore needed was imported from abroad, 7% from Poznan and only 7% from Germany itself.

In the face of this how does Keynes' thesis look, which asserts that Silesian foundry work is based on Lorraine ore, that in Lorraine lies its natural source of supply? That source of supply is not in Lorraine but in the Polish districts in the immediate vicinity of the Silesian coal field, where there are immense and as yet unexploited stores of ore, the amount of which is estimated at from 300,000,000 to 600,000,000 of tons, and which guarantees the development of the smelting industry both in Upper Silesia and in our Dombrowa and Cracow coal fields. This is that near territory which is extremely rich in ore, this is that territory which is economically united to Silesia, about which Keynes knew nothing at all, since he wanted to look for ore in Alsace and Lorraine, on the other border of Germany, when there at the very frontier that ore existed. And Keynes could know about that because the Upper Silesian Mining and Foundry Union, already in the year 1913 laid special emphasis upon that fact. The policy also of the former German Occupation authorities in Congress Poland aimed at throwing the greatest possible amount of Polish ore into Upper Silesia. Finally, during the war also, all the memorials presented by the economic circles of Upper Silesia to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg demanded Polish and not Lorraine ore.

"The fall of the Upper Silesian Foundry industry" we read in the memorial presented by the Upper Silesian Mining and Foundry Association "and what follows, of the coal-mining industry, as the most important customer for coal is the iron industry, would cause the general ruin of industrial and economic life in Upper Si-

lesia. But in the first place our military interests require that the Upper Silesian iron industry should be maintained and that would only be possible if the Upper Silesian foundries could receive after the war also Polish ore. This fact explains the extremely joyful manner in which the Silesian foundries greeted the news that the German troops had occupied the Polish territories which contain ore“.

This is not a Polish but a German reply to Keynes' thesis that the Lorraine ore is indispensable to Upper Silesia. And this joyful greeting by the Upper Silesian foundries of the news of the occupation by the German troops of Polish territory—a temporary occupation only—should be changed, should it not, into a hymn of gratitude if Upper Silesia went back to its Polish mother—country and the Upper Silesian foundries were joined into one economic whole with the territory of Congress Poland where are situated the ore beds which would secure the foundries a new and strong development, such as has hitherto been unknown in the annals of Silesia.

### **HOW WILL THE FOUNDRIES OF UPPER SILESIA BEST DEVELOP? — UNDER POLISH OR UNDER GERMAN MANAGEMENT?**

The question of the surplus production of the Upper Silesian foundries and iron manufactories is strictly connected with the ore question. And here we see that the economic union with Germany did not benefit the Silesian smelting industry. From 1909 until 1913 the increase in the production of raw material amounted only to 17%, whereas the total production of Germany increased by 50%. The part taken by Upper Silesia in the total production of Germany decreased accordingly. In the year 1871 the raw iron smelted in Silesia constituted nearly 15% of the whole production of Germany and in 1913 it constituted only 5%. Here again we have a proof of how Silesia was neglected. Again we see that Upper Silesia, even on the surplus markets near to it, could not keep up with the German foundries. It was even worse, for the Silesian market itself, with the exception of the Opolska Regency, covered only 55% of its demand with its own iron in the year 1911, and the rest was imported from other parts of Germany and especially from Westphalia. The process of expelling Silesian iron from other German markets and establishing German iron there, was yet more striking. In 1884 45% of the iron used in Poznan came from Silesia and in 1911, only 36%. In Berlin within the same period the percentage of Silesian iron used fell from 20% to 14%, in Brandenburg from 16% to 13%, and in Saxony from 17% to 12%. Hence Silesia could only supply even its nearest markets to an inconsiderable extent, for Westphalian competition hustled it out and it turned its whole attention to Poland which was separated from it at that time by a fiscal barrier.

When, then, will the Upper Silesian smelting industry have better chances of development? Will it be if it is united to Germany which cannot give it ore and expels its iron from her markets, or will it be if it is joined to united Poland, which has unexploited treasures of ore and forms an immense and insatiable market for iron?

### **WHO FEEDS UPPER SILESIA?**

Let us now examine the question as to who supplies Upper Silesia with food stuffs? Who feeds its working masses? Poland feeds them. In spite of the fiscal frontier Silesia received almost twice as much corn from Poland as from Germany,

$3\frac{1}{2}$  times as many potatoes, and 4 times as much pork which is the basic food of the local population. Thus, who feeds Upper Silesia? Poland feeds it. Silesia is economically bound to Poland and not to Germany.

And on what wood did Upper Silesian mining depend? Silesia received from Poland during the war three times as much wood for its mines and for burning, as it received from Germany, and of wood prepared for manufactures it received 5 times as much, whilst of logs it received 12 times as much.

Again, whence did Poland get artificial manure to be used in the cultivation of her fields? From Silesia. Silesia exported into Poland  $1\frac{1}{4}$  times more than to Germany. I have only mentioned certain factors here, and how many more threads there are that economically unite Upper Silesia to Poland!

These figures, and these sources — which, it must be remembered are not Polish, — but which are given by the Germans — prove very clearly with what a power of truth the Polish Government can and must unmask all that host of economic falsehoods which are gathering round Upper Silesia.

### **WHAT DID THE UPPER SILESIAN GERMANS DEMAND IN THEIR SECRET MEMORIALS?**

But the best sources of all are the secret memorials which the Upper Silesian economic organizations continued sending to Bethmann Hollweg and other Chancellors from the beginning of the war until its end. There is one leading thought in all these memorials — Upper Silesia is stifling in Germany, its economic development is restrained. In one of these memorials we read as follows: "In consequence of the inconvenient position of the Upper Silesian industrial district, Poland will continue to be extremely important for its economic development in the future and we may even say that it will be impossible to replace Poland in this respect. Should Poland for a long time not serve the ends of Upper Silesia, then Upper Silesian industries would have to come to a standstill, and their value for the restoration and development of the German State would decrease". The figures which I have already quoted lead incontrovertably to the same conclusion. These figures must have led the Germans of Upper Silesia to the political conceptions which they set forth in their secret memorials. They demand the economic union of Silesia and Poland — but in another form — they demand the union of Poland to Upper Silesia. "And if", we read in these memorials, "the German Federation should not be strong enough to join Poland to Upper Silesia, then what was to be done with it? Should it be handed over to Austria? No! It could not be given to Austria, for then Austria would be made too powerful and that would be an economic checkmate for Germany. So what did the Upper Silesian economic organizations demand from Bethmann-Hollweg? If the German Federation was not strong enough to take possession of the whole of Poland, then it should at any rate take possession of the districts bordering on Silesia, of those immeasurable treasures of ore, without which Upper Silesia could not exist.

And if the Germans could not do that either, let them give Poland over to Russia, so as in that way to make a golden bridge between themselves and the immense expanses of the east. Such, during the war, was the political idea in German economic circles in Upper Silesia — the union of Poland to Silesia or the union

of Poland to Russia, so that Silesia should find an outlet for its economic expansion in Poland or, through Poland, in Russia, so as to lay the firm foundation of its influence there, so that the German Federation should win a new continental power in case its sea power should be shaken.

### **FOR WHAT PURPOSE DOES GERMANY NEED UPPER SILESIA?**

How significant is that fact — these German hands stretched out over Poland to her eastern enemy! Besides the facts of race, besides the facts of history, here is the explanation of the problem why, when the walls of Warsaw quivered from the firing during the Bolshevik invasion, East Prussia fermented, why then in Upper Silesia a bloody terror reigned over the population. That is the immemorial political and economic principle of Germany — to push towards the east (Drang nach Osten) — direct contact with Russia through Poland and at the expense of Poland, to make use of Poland as a bridge between itself and the eastern colossus. And in that lies the question of the economic equilibrium of Europe. Upper Silesia, if left to the Germans, would be a tool of German imperialism. Upper Silesia in the hands of Poland would be a means of confirming Poland's economic existence, hence a means of defending her against German imperialism, and thus a means of maintaining equilibrium in Europe.

In times of peace Silesia is stifled in Germany, Silesian industries must seek an issue in Poland or, through Poland, and it is only in time of war that Silesia becomes indispensable for German war needs. This is shown by those memorials of the Upper Silesian economic organizations. There we read as follows:

"We shall not be saying too much if we assert that it would have been impossible to wage war considering the very great demand which existed for manufactured articles belonging to the most various departments of military technique, had not Upper Silesian industries been fully able to help the German nation in meeting the requirements of war".

### **WHY IS UPPER SILESIA NECESSARY TO POLAND AND POLAND TO UPPER SILESIA?**

Silesia is not necessary to Poland for war but for the peaceful restoration of her economic strength.

Upper Silesia was economically cramped within the boundaries of the German Federation even whilst it leaned all along one side on Poznan and West Prussia which were its granaries, and now Poznan is ours and West Prussia is ours, hence if Upper Silesia had not enough to live on then, how could it live now? Now Upper Silesia in the German federation would be an economic absurdity and would be the cause of political misfortune to the whole continent. The Germans would hang out Upper Silesia like a bloody banner, tormenting its population, the Polish national consciousness of which nothing can now nullify: they would involuntarily make it a torch which would set alight eternal fires of conflict in central Europe, but they would give it no economic advantages, which only Poland can give Upper Silesia.

And on the other hand, can Poland succeed economically without Silesia? Is it not in the highest degree delusive to say to Poland. "Be economically strong, be politically well-balanced, defend us from Eastern Bolshevism", and at the same time to force us to live on those ruined remains which the German Occupants left on our territory. Even then we understood German policy, even then in that quasi-modo, in that parody of a parliament, in that Council of State, we declared to them that the aim of their economic policy was clear to us. The Germans who proclaimed that they feared nobody except God, yet feared Polish industries as a competitor which would be threatening to them in the future. Hence they tried to annihilate those industries so that Poland should have all her living sap dried up, so that afterwards, when the time for accounts after the war came, when the Polish state stood politically on its feet, they could say that Poland was an economically dead organism, which could not produce, so that they could compromise Poland before she could confirm her political existence. And that was the greatest curse of German policy towards Poland. Through that policy the workshops of our labour and of our communication are ruined, through it we cannot raise our currency, and the more so now, when the whole world is passing through an economic crisis, the end of which is not in view. Hence it is necessary that the whole world should know what economic circumstances the German Occupants created in Poland and in what a condition Poland began her political existence. The world should also know what proofs Poland gave before the war of its power to develop. The statics of her industries were not imposing for those industries were young and had not yet had time to become such a power as German industries. But the dynamics of our industries — just because they were young, pointed to a swifter development than took place even in Germany. In Congress Poland between 1897 and 1910 the number of persons employed in the industries increased by 65% and in Germany this increase between 1895 and 1907 was only 36%. Even after war, in spite of devastation, and ruin, Polish industries are being restored. The mining of coal in our Dombrowa and Cracow coal fields has improved more during the year 1919 than even in Upper Silesia, where the mines were not destroyed. The amount of coal mined in our two coal fields amounted during 1919 to 68% of the amount mined before the war, whilst in Upper Silesia it only amounted to 64% of the amount mined there before the war.

## THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND THE ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM OF EUROPE DEMAND THAT UPPER SILESIA BE GIVEN TO POLAND.

If Upper Silesia is given over to Poland, the advantage of its wealth will be secured to the whole world. Poland has signed the Treaty of Versailles, she has bound herself to give the Germans access to the Upper Silesian coal. Poland understands the economic circumstances of Europe, she will act according to her tradition and she will divide the wealth of coal not only with the Germans but even with whole world, she will be able to supplement the resources of France and Italy, which need coal the most for their economic restoration. For Poland is a faithful ally, in whose policy there are no factors contrary to the interests of western Europe, who, squeezed in between Germany and Russia, is not and cannot be, even because of her very geographical position, imperialist. Our attitude is only an attitude of defence

of our existence, of defence of our national idea, and for this defence we all unite in the most difficult moments. And that we can, at critical moments, forget the differences of opinion which separate us, we proved at the time of the Bolshevik invasion and we are proving at the present moment when the fate of Upper Silesia is in the balance in the west and when the fate of the constitution is being decided here. We see that our Diet can change its appearance, can adapt itself to the new political situation, and is taking steps to bring about an understanding between the parties, of which understanding there could be no question three weeks ago. For we wish to build up Poland, in every department, we wish to exert all our strength in toil, in torment and in struggle — for there must be struggles too: there are too many opposing views, too many provincial differences, too many ideas from the west and from the east for it to be otherwise. For we are not an oasis surrounded by a Chinese wall. Everything which is being done in the world must find its echo among us. Yet we must possess a strong foundation for our development if Europe is really to believe in us.

Up to the present time France believes in us, believes instinctively, believes because of tradition, by a certain mutual impulse of the spirit, common to both nations. Therefore we are convinced that France will not sell us, that she will not barter Upper Silesia for her compensation for the war. And that is not through sentiment for us, nor because of any moral obligation. France knows that the increase of compensation for the war will not be of much use if, as the result of her obtaining that extra compensation, Poland is not a strong, economically independent ally, a strongly organized state. France understands that if the Germans to-day take Upper Silesia from Poland, to-morrow they will stretch out their hands for Alsace and Lorraine and on the day after they will dream of the Prussian uniform appearing anew under the walls of Paris.

That this may not happen — Upper Silesia must belong to Poland. For without Upper Silesia Poland cannot build herself up, she cannot create anything from nothing, she cannot get iron and coal for starting work in the factories ruined by the Germans, she cannot become a strong, healthy and independent state.

And if France understands this, it is impossible to suppose that England could not take the same point of view, England who prides herself upon her wide outlook upon the world, who goes out beyond the policy of the present day, who sees, in the harmonizing of the economic interests of the whole world, the shortest way out of the economic cataclysm caused by the war, a cataclysm which is even extending to the other hemisphere. England does not know Poland, nobody knows Poland, for she did not exist for so many years, and during those two years since our restoration we have had to struggle with such difficulties as no state in the world has had to contend with. And yet, if even some of our friends have doubted us, we have contrived to defend our political existence against the Bolshevik flood.

## **WHEN KEYNES LEARNS THE TRUTH HE WILL SUPPORT THE POLISH CAUSE.**

But England too must believe in facts! And if Keynes, whose book is impregnated with a humanitarian spirit and with understanding of the necessity to get up beyond selfish interests, if Keynes is convinced by actual data that he has done a wrong, that he has wrought confusion in the ideas of statesmen and politicians as

regards Upper Silesia, then he too will see with his eyes and must become the friend of Poland, of Poland as an active factor in the development of the natural wealth of Silesia.

### **POLAND WILL DEFEND UPPER SILESIA BY THE TRUTH.**

Hence I call upon the Government in the name of my party and in the name of whole Diet—for there are matters which each and all of us feel in the same way, there are views which the whole Diet, without difference of party, must share, — to put forth every effort to win Upper Silesia. And since the economic problem in the Upper Silesian question is the dominating one, since the falsehoods which have been told about that question have been multiplied, since that false German propaganda has spread so far, we must at this moment unite every moral and material effort to hold up before the eyes of the world the propaganda of the economic truth concerning Poland and concerning Upper Silesia.

We are convinced that if that propaganda of truth is spread, the cause of Upper Silesia must be won, for not only the interests of Poland demand this. The interests of France demand it, the interests of England demand it, the interests of the peace and economic development of the whole of Europe demand it, and, through economic solidarity, the whole round world is interested in that question, including that ally of ours who first heralded the restoration of Poland and her independence — the United States of America.

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**Sources and documents.**



**REPLY OF THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS TO THE OBSERVATIONS  
OF THE GERMAN DELEGATION ON THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE MAY  
29 1919. CHAPTER CONCERNING UPPER SILESIA. (p. 14).**

A considerable portion of the German answer is devoted to the question of Upper Silesia. It is recognised that the problem here differs from that in Posen and West Prussia they were for the reason that Upper Silesia was not a part of the Polish territories when dismembered by the Partition. It may be said that Poland has no legal claim to the cession of Upper Silesia; it is emphatically not true that she has no claim which could be supported on the principles of President Wilson. In the district to be ceded, the majority of the population is indisputably Polish. Every German book of reference, every school-book, teaches the German child that the inhabitants are Polish in origin and in speech. The Allied and Associated Powers would have been acting in complete violation of the principles which the German Government itself professes to accept had they left unregarded the Polish claims to this district.

However the German Government now contest these conclusions. They insist that separation from Germany is not in accordance with the wishes or the interests of the population. Under these circumstances the Allied and Associated Powers are willing to allow the question to be determined by those particularly concerned. They have therefore decided that this territory shall not be immediately ceded to Poland, but that arrangements shall be made to hold a plebiscite there.

They would gladly have avoided this, for the appeal must be postponed for some considerable time. It will involve the temporary occupation of the district by foreign troops. In order to secure the full impartiality of the vote, it will be necessary to establish a separate Commission to administer the territory during the intervening period.

Moreover, in order to prevent Germany from being deprived arbitrarily of materials necessary for her industrial life, an additional Article has been included in the Treaty providing that mineral products, including coal, produced in any part of Upper Silesia that may be transferred, shall be available for purchase by Germany on the same terms as by the Poles themselves.

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In order further to meet any criticism regarding the consequences of the transfer of territory to Poland, the Allied and Associated Powers have introduced a new provision, described below in the paragraphs on Property, Rights and Interests, the effect of which will be to give protection to Germans in any liquidation of their property.

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The restoration of the Polish State is a great historical act which cannot be achieved without breaking many ties and causing temporary difficulty and distress to many individuals. But it has been the special concern of the Allied and Associated Powers to provide for the adequate protection of those Germans who will find themselves transferred to Poland, as well as of all other religious, racial or linguistic minorities. There is in the Treaty a clause by which there will be secured to them the enjoyment of religious liberty and also the right to use their own language and that of having their children educated in their own language. They will not be subjected to persecution similar to that which Poles had to endure from the Prussian State.

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**OBSERVATIONS OF THE GERMAN DELEGATION ON THE CONDITIONS OF  
PEACE MAY 29 1919. UPPER SILESIA (p 57—59).**

Germany cannot do without Upper Silesia and its coal. On the other hand Poland does not need Upper Silesia.

The most important product of Upper Silesia is coal.

Last years' coal production of Upper Silesia amounted to  $43\frac{1}{2}$  millions of tons — or 23 per cent of the whole production of Germany, which amounts to 190 millions of tons.

The cession of Upper Silesia to Poland would not only cause the industrial ruin of Upper Silesia — it would also cause serious harm to Germany from an economical point of view. Up to the present date, the Upper Silesian coal has supplied the needs of all Germany's industry in her Eastern Provinces, inasmuch as she was not obliged to have coal imported from England or sent from her Rhine-Provinces and Westphalia, by way of the Baltic. Upper Silesia has also supplied parts of Southern Germany, and, besides the industrial needs, she has supplied mostly the gas-factories and satisfied domestic consumption. Altogether more than 25 millions of people have been supplied with coal from Upper Silesia. Should Upper Silesia be assigned to Poland, this fundamental economic necessity would run a great risk of failing.

In times of peace, Poland utilized nearly  $10\frac{1}{2}$  millions of tons, whereas the Polish coal-production, from the contiguous Polish coal-fields, not belonging to Upper Silesia, amounted to 6,6 millions of tons. To fill up the shortage she imported one million and a half tons from Upper Silesia and found the rest in the mines of the Tcheco-Slovakia of to-day.

The Poles could easily find sufficient coal to satisfy their wants in their own coal-districts, excepting certain special qualities of coal, especially if Poland exploits her mines, which till now have not been methodically organized. Added to this, by the acquisition of Galicia, Poland obtains an important increase of riches of the soil. This may be said especially of the coal-veins lately discovered in West Galicia.

It is in the interest of the Allied and Associated Powers to leave Upper Silesia to Germany, as the latter could only then fulfil the obligations resulting from the world's war, if Upper Silesia remains in her possession — but would never be able to do so, if the contrary were the case. If for no other reason than this Germany cannot consent to the cession of Upper Silesia.

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**SELECTION FROM J. M. KEYNES WORK "THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES  
OF THE PEACE". Macmillan and Co, Limited, London, 1920.  
KEYNES ON UPPER SILESIAN COAL (p. 78).**

"The industries of Eastern Germany depend upon it for their coal; and its loss would be a destructive blow at the economic structure of the German State".

"It must not be overlooked, however, that, amongst the other concessions relating to Silesia accorded in the Allies' Final Note, there has been included Article 90, by which "Poland undertakes to permit for a period of fifteen years the exportation to Germany of the products of the mines in any part of Upper Silesia transferred to Poland in accordance with the present Treaty. Such products shall be free from all export duties or other charges or restrictions on exportation. Poland agrees to take such steps as may be necessary to secure that any such products shall be available for sale to purchasers in Germany on terms as favourable as are applicable to like products sold under similar conditions to purchasers in Poland or in any other country". This does not apparently amount to a right of pre-emption, and it is not easy to estimate its effective practical consequences. It is evident, however, that in so far as the mines are maintained at their former efficiency, and in so far as Germany is in a position to purchase substantially her former supplies from that source, the loss is limited to the effect on her balance of trade, and is without the more serious repercussions on her economic life which are contemplated in the text. Here is an opportunity for the Allies to render more tolerable the actual operation of the settlement. The Germans, it should be added, have pointed out that the same economic argument which adds the Saar fields to France, allots Upper Silesia to Germany. For whereas the Silesian mines are essential to the economic life of Germany, Poland does not need them. Of Poland's pre-war annual demand of 10,500,000 tons, 6,800,000 tons were supplied by the indisputably Polish districts adjacent to Upper Silesia, 1,500,000 tons from Upper Silesia (out of a total Upper Silesian output of 43,500,000 tons), and the balance from what is now Czecho-Slovakia. Even without any supply from Upper Silesia and Czecho-Slovakia, Poland could probably meet her requirements by the fuller exploitation of her own coalfields which are not yet scientifically developed, or from the deposits of Western Galicia which are now to be annexed to her".

## KEYNES ON IRON-ORE.

### Page 90.

"While Lorraine comprised 75 per cent of Germany's iron-ore, only 25 per cent of the blast furnaces lay within Lorraine and the Saar basin together, a large proportion of the ore being carried into Germany proper. Approximately the same proportion of Germany's iron and steel foundries, namely 25 per cent, were situated in Alsace-Lorraine. For the moment, therefore, the most economical and profitable course would certainly be to export to Germany, as hitherto, a considerable part of the output of the mines.

On the other hand, France, having recovered the deposits of Lorraine, may be expected to aim at replacing as far as possible the industries, which Germany had based on them, by industries situated within her own frontiers. Much time must elapse before the plant and the skilled labour could be developed within France, and even so she could hardly deal with the ore unless she could rely on receiving the coal from Germany. The uncertainty, too, as to the ultimate fate of the Saar will be disturbing to the calculations of capitalists who contemplate the establishment of new industries in France".

### Page 91.

"It seems certain, calculating on the present passions and impulses of European capitalistic society, that the effective iron output of Europe will be diminished by a new political frontier (which sentiment and historic justice require), because nationalism and private interest are thus allowed to impose a new economic frontier along the same lines".

### Page 92.

"The same influences are likely to be seen, though on a lesser scale, in the event of the transference of Upper Silesia to Poland. While Upper Silesia contains but little iron, the presence of coal has led to the establishment of numerous blast furnaces. What is to be the fate of these? If Germany is cut off from her supplies of ore on the west, will she export beyond her frontiers on the east any part of the little which remains to her? The efficiency and output of the industry seem certain to diminish.

"Thus the Treaty strikes at organisation, and by the destruction of organisation impairs yet further the reduced wealth of the whole community. The economic frontiers which are to be established between the coal and the iron, upon which modern industrialism is founded, will not only diminish the production of useful commodities, but may possibly occupy an immense quantity of human labour in dragging iron or coal, as the case may be, over many useless miles to satisfy the dictates of a political treaty or because obstructions have been established to the proper localisation of industry".

## KEYNES ON THE PLEBISCITE IN UPPER SILESIA.

Page 247.

„The arrangement as to Upper Silesia should hold good. That is to say, a plebiscite should be held, and in coming to a final decision" regard will be paid (by the principal Allied and Associated Powers) to the wishes of the inhabitants as shown by the vote, and to the geographical and economic conditions of the locality"<sup>1</sup>). But the Allies should declare that in their judgment "economic conditions" require the inclusion of the coal districts in Germany unless the wishes of the inhabitants are decidedly to the contrary".

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<sup>1</sup>) Treaty of Peace, art. 88, annex § 5.

# COAL COMMISSION FOR CENTRAL EUROPE.

Twentyfifth Meeting held at Morawska Ostrawa C. S. 11 a. m. Friday March 26.  
1920. at the chairmanship of Col. H. C. Nutt.

Extract of the draff minutes.

Mr. J a c o b i (Germany) submitted figures showing distribution of Upper Silesian coal in the years 1911, 1912 and 1913 which are summerized below:

	1911	1912	1913
Production: . . . . .	36,622,969	41,543,442	43,801,056
Less coal used at mines . . . . .	3,601,019	3,644,274	3,672,392
	<u>33,021,950</u>	<u>37,899,168</u>	<u>40,128,664</u>
Less mine in Petershofen . . . . .	561,000	571,400	573,579
	<u>32,460,950</u>	<u>37,327,768</u>	<u>39,555,085</u>

## SH I P E D:

Coal, briquettes, coke expressed in coal (7 — 10).	1911	1912	1913	Average 1911—13
To Congress Poland . . . . .	1,374,364	1,359,519	1,524,943	1,419,519
„ Galizian . . . . .	1,207,379	1,475,532	1,962,803	1,548,571
„ Pozen . . . . .	2,043,263	2,218,792	2,451,375	2,237,810
„ Namslau . . . . .	14,061	11,425	12,750	12,745
„ West Prussia . . . . .	677,800	740,587	754,912	724,433
„ Soldau . . . . .	10,452	12,302	11,685	11,480
Total	5,327,319	5,818,157	6,718,468	5,954,658

Poland states besides that to the Eastern frontier districts which it has occupied about 109,000 tons and to that part of the Teschen ares which is on the Polish side of the present demarkation line 660,000 tons coal and coke were shipped from Upper Silesia in 1913. These figures cannot be proved here.

The following note was added by the German Delegate just previous to submission to the Commission of the table of statistics:

In the table concerning shipments of Upper Silesian coal to Poland, Austria and Czecho-Slovakia in 1911, 1912 and 1913, put before the Chairman, all those quantities are included full which were shipped to border stations and which appear in statistics as received by those stations. There can be no doubt that large portions of those quantities were not consumed in those border stations or within those territories to which those stations now belong, but were shipped beyond these territories. In case that this table concerning the shipments from Upper Silesia to Poland, Austria and Czecho-Slovakia in 1911, 1912 and 1913 should later become of any practical significance for deliveries of Upper Silesian coal, the proviso is now expressly made that a special understanding must be reached on the modus under which the quantities shipped to those border stations should be proportioned to the quantities actually consumed by the countries concerned, and that the quantities considered reshipped or transshipped than be deducted from those figures.

**Polish remarks to the German statements of March 23, 1920 with regard to the Consumption of Upper Silesian coal in Poland in 1913.**

1. Regarding the consumption of 109,120 tons on the Polish Eastern Provinces and 660,234 in Teschen on the Polish side of the military demarkation line of 1919.

These figures were calculated station by station from the statistics of Upper Silesian shipments (according to the "Uebersicht ueber des Oberschlesischen Steinkohlenversandt nach den einzelnen Stationen des In- und Auslandes im Jahre 1913) and verified by the Czecho-Slovak Delegate. They have been included in the figures of the Polish consumption of Upper Silesian coal, shown in the minutes of the eighth meeting of the Central European Coal Commission of 9th September 1919.

On account of new territories being liberated from the Bolshevists during the and beginning of 1920 the figures of 109,000 tons must be increased to 150,000 tons. Those two items of 660,234 tons and 150,000 tons must therefore be added to the figures of 6,718,498 of the German statement.

**2. Border Stations.**

There is no question that the above quantities have been exported from Upper Silesia, and that of shipped to border stations, their main destination was not for the border stations, but for the territory to which the border stations now belong.

The Polish Delegates agree that, should the German assumption be found correct and should it be proved, that part of this coal has been reshipped outside the Polish territory this amount, when proved, should be deducted from the amount of the Polish consumption, but they consider this question of no practical importance.

**3. Danzig.**

In the German statement of March 26, 1920 Danzig is excluded from the Polish figures, hence a difference of 426,000 tons in consumption of Upper Silesian coal between Polish and German figures.

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## **EXECUTION OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES BY THE GERMANS AS CONCERNING THE SUPPLYING OF COAL FOR THE ALLIED POWERS.**

As a result of the Conference in Spa, the Germans signed on the 16-th of July, 1920, at Fraineuse, a protocol, comprising, among others, the following obligations concerning the supplying of coal.

I. The German Government takes over the obligation from the 1-st of August, 1920, and during the course of the following six months, to put at the disposition of the Allies two millions of tons of coal monthly — the quantity approved of by the Commission of Indemnification.

II. The Allied Governments shall count the value of the coal supplied by the Germans by rail or water-way, on the indemnity-list, which value shall be appraised according to the prices in Germany, conformably to the § VI, let. A. suppl. V. part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles. Moreover, in exchange for attributing the Allies the right of claiming coal of good quality and sort, the side receiving the coal is to pay the Germans a premium amounting to five marks in gold, per ton, paid in cash destined to purchase food-supplies for the German miners.

III. During the period above-mentioned of the supplying of coal, the regulations contained in the §§ II, III and IV of the protocol, dated July 11-th 1920 (in reference to the control, in modified form, according to the enclosed supplement) immediately come into life.

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## PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF COAL IN GERMANY, POLAND AND UPPER-SILESIA.

(calculated on the basis of the official German data as well as of the data controlled by the International Coal Commission at Ostrawa Morawska <sup>1)</sup> see previous addenda 4 and 5).

The Polish territories now reunited consumed in 1913:

	tons	
Coal and coke . . . . .	19,178,000	
Lignite 891,000 tons		
which, reduced to its equivalent in		
pit coal, according to the proportion		
of 3 : 10 corresponds to: . . . . .	267,000	
Total	19,445,000	

When tabulating these figures the coke was expressed in terms of coal in the proportion of 10:7. As concerns the lignite briquettes, they have been expressed in the corresponding quantities of lignite and the quantity of lignite has been multiplied by 3 as the caloric value of a ton of briquettes corresponds on an average to about 3 tons of lignite.

The following figures indicate the consumption of coal by the different parts of Poland.

### I. Coal.

	tons	tons
Former Congress Poland: coal: . . . . .	7,438,000	
603,000 tons of coke expressed in		
terms of coal . . . . .	861,000	8,299,000
Galicia: coal: . . . . .	4,163,000	
62,900 tons of coke expressed in		
terms of coal . . . . .	90,000	4,253,000
Poznań: coal: . . . . .	2,518,000	
55,910 tons of coke expressed in		
terms of coal . . . . .	80,000	2,598,000
Polish West Prussia with Danzig: coal: .	1,480,000	
40,000 tons of coke expressed in		
terms of coal . . . . .	57,000	1,537,000

<sup>1)</sup> „The Economic connection of Upper Silesia with Poland and with Germany“ by George Kramsztyk delegate to the Polish Government in the International Coal Commission at Ostrawa Morawska (paga 7—14).

	tons	tons
The Polish part of Teschen Silesia:		
coal: . . . . .	851,000	
8,000 tons of coke expressed in terms of coal . . . . .	11,000	862,000
The Polish provinces to the east of Con- gress Poland:		
coal: . . . . .	1,620,000	
6,000 tons of coke expressed in terms of coal . . . . .	9,000	1,629,000
Total amount of coal:	18,070,000	19,178,000
coke: 776,000 tons ex- pressed in terms of coal	1,108,000	
	19,178,000	

## II. Lignite.

Former Congress Poland: Lignite: . . . . .	155,000	
400 tons of lignite briquettes expres- sed in terms of lignite . . . . .	1,200	156,000 <sup>1)</sup>
Galicia: lignite: . . . . .		37,000
Poznania: lignite: . . . . .	30,600	
161,200 tons of lignite briquettes ex- pressed in terms of lignite . . . . .	483,600	514,000
Polish West Prussia with Danzig:		
61,200 tons of lignite briquettes ex- pressed in terms of lignite: . . . . .		184,000
Total in round numbers. . . . .		891,000
Lignite . . . . .	223,000	
222,800 tons of lignite briquettes expressed in terms of lignite . . . . .	668,000	
	891,000	
Total of coal: . . . . .	19,178,000	
Total of lignite 891,000 tons expressed in terms of coal: . . . . .	267,000	
	19,445,000	

This coal and coke came partly from the Polish coal-fields but the greater part of it was imported from outside Poland.

The origin of the coal and coke consumed by Poland in 1913 is as follows:

## I. Pit coal:

	tons	tons
A. Coal:		
Produced by the Dombrowa coal field: . . . . .		6,834,000
Produced by the Cracow coal field: . . . . .		1,971,000
Produced by the mine „Silesia” in Teschen Silesia: . . . . .		184,000
Total production for Poland: . . . . .		8,989,000

<sup>1)</sup> In round numbers.

	tons	tons
Imported from Upper Silesia . . . . .	7,370,000	
Imported from Germany . . . . .	186,000	
Imported from the Ostrawa—Karwin coal field . . . . .	463,000	
Imported from the Don coal-field . . . . .	1,000,000	
Imported from other coal-fields . . . . .	160,000	
Total imported . . . . .	9,179,000	9,179,000
		<hr/> 18,168,000
Minus the coal exported from the Cracow coal-field. . . . .	23,000	
Minus the coal exported from the mine "Silesia" . . . . .	75,000	98,000
		<hr/> 18,070,000

## B. Coke:

Imported from the Ostrawa-Karwin coal-field . . . . .	338,000	
Imported from Upper Silesia . . . . .	339,000	
Imported from Germany . . . . .	96,000	
Imported from the Don coal-field. . . . .	3,000	1,108,000
Expressed in terms of coal. . . . .	776,000	19,178,000

## II. Lignite:

A. Lignite:		
Produced by former Congress Poland . . . . .	155,000	
Produced by Galicia . . . . .	37,400	
Produced by Poznań . . . . .	25,000	
Total produced by Poland . . . . .		217,400
Imported from Germany . . . . .	5,600	5,600
		<hr/> 223,000

## B. Lignite Briquettes:

222,800 tons imported from Germany, expressed in terms of lignite . . . . .		668,000
		<hr/> 891,000

Total of coal . . . . .	19,178,000	
Total of lignite, 891,000 tons, expressed in terms of coal . . . . .	267,000	
	<hr/> 19,445,000	

Of the different kinds of Polish coal the Dombrowa coal was almost exclusively used in the former Congress Poland and the Cracow coal in Little Poland (Galicia). The coke from the Ostrawa—Karwin coal-field went to Little Poland.

As regards, specially, the Upper Silesian coal, it was divided among the different partitions of the country as follows: <sup>1)</sup>

Former Congress Poland	tons	tons
Coal . . . . .	1,203,555	
Coke (224,972 tons in terms of coal) . . . . .	321,388	1,524,943

<sup>1)</sup> Remark: The briquettes, on account of the relatively small amount of them imported, are not placed in a separate column but are included with the coal.

Galicia: (Little Poland):		tons	tons
Coal . . . . .		1,880,515	
Coke (57,602 tons in terms of coal) . . . .		82,283	1,962,803
Poznanian, including the Namyslow (Nams- lau) district:			
Coal . . . . .		2,416,121	
Coke (33,603 tons in terms of coal). . . .		48,004	2,464,125
Polish West Prussia, including the district of Dzialdowo . . . . .			
Coal . . . . .		748,134	
Coke (12,924 tons expressed in terms of coal) . . . . .		18,463	766,597
The town of Danzig:			
Coal . . . . .		415,000	
Coke (7,000 tons expressed in terms of coal) . . . . .		10,000	425,000
The Polish part of Teschen Silesia:			
Coal . . . . .		611,035	
Coke (1,857 tons expressed in terms of coal) . . . . .		2,653	613,688
Polish provinces to the east of Congress Poland:			
Coal . . . . .		95,385	
Coke (700 tons expressed in terms of coal) . . . . .		1,000	96,385
Coal (total) . . . . .		7,369,745	7,853,541
Coke (total)—338,658 tons expressed in terms of coal . . . . .		483,796	
		7,853,541	

It must be mentioned that the figures for the export from Upper Silesia to the former Congress Kingdom of Poland, to Galicia and to Poznanian, as well as to West Prussia, have been compared and found in agreement with the data of German experts. As concerns the data for Upper Silesian export to Danzig, to Teschen Silesia and to the Eastern Territories, they were arrived at by the only reasonable method which could be applied here, namely on the basis of the German railway statistics which show how much coal, coke and briquettes went from Upper Silesia to the different stations. (According to "Uebersicht über den Oberschlesischen Steinkohlen Versand nach den einzelnen Stationen des in und Auslandes" for the year 1913). From the German side certain reservations were made with regard to the application of this method for Polish Teschen Silesia on the ground that part of the coal which was sent to stations in Teschen Silesia was supposed to be sent on further from these stations: The Germans experts are not, however, in a position to support this contention of theirs with any concrete proof. If even it be accepted that actually a part of the coal sent to Teschen was sent further on, beyond the present frontiers of the Polish State, that part could not have been a very considerable one.

From a comparison of the above figures relating to the import into Poland from Upper Silesia with the figures relating to the use of coal and coke in Poland it results that the use of Upper Silesian coal and coke amounted in 1913 to 40.4% of all the coal used. The amount used in the former Congress Kingdom constituted 18% of the total consumption covered by coal and coke from Upper Silesia, in Galicia about 50%; in the former Prussian province of Poznań almost the whole demand before the war (90%) was covered by coal and coke from Upper Silesia.

In proportion to the whole production of coal in Upper Silesia which, in 1913, amounted to as much as 43,170,000 tons,<sup>1)</sup> the consumption by Poland amounted to 18.2% and represents 29% of the total transport of coal by the railways to places beyond the frontiers of Upper Silesia. In consequence of the fact that in 1913 Upper Silesia itself consumed 13,885,000 tons of coal and coke of its own production, on a total consumption of 14,012,000 — the total consumption of Upper Silesian coal on Polish territory, in case that province should be reunited to Poland would be approximately expressed by the figures 22,000,000 tons, which would be  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the total consumption of all the Polish territories united, including Upper Silesia (19,445,000 tons, plus 14,012,000 tons which equals 33,457,000 tons).

The figures which have just been quoted show plainly that the Upper Silesian coal is a fundamental item in the coal balance of Poland.

Let us now pass on to the figures which show the part played by the Upper Silesian coal in the general coal-balance of Germany.

The total production of pit coal in Germany, including Upper Silesia <sup>1)</sup>, Alsace Lorraine and the basin of the Saare, amounted in 1913 <sup>2)</sup> to 190,109,440 tons.

Plus the coal imported into Germany:	tons	tons
1. Coal . . . . .	10,540,069	
2. Coal briquettes . . . . .	27,272	
3. 594,501 tons of coke expressed in terms of coal . . . . .	849,287	11,416,628
		<hr/> 201,526,068
Minus the export from Germany:		
1. Coal . . . . .	34,598,408	
2. Coal briquettes . . . . .	2,302,602	
3. 6,432,986 tons of coke expressed in terms of coal . . . . .	9,189,980	46,090,990

The consumption of coal and coke in Germany within its then frontiers amounted, thus, in 1913, to 155,435,078 tons.

In order to arrive at the quantity of coal and coke consumed in Germany in 1913 by the provinces forming its actual territory, we must subtract from the figure of 155,435,078 tons the total consumption of the provinces which, as the result of the treaty of Versailles, were detached from Germany.

The consumption of coal in these territories was as follows:

<sup>1)</sup> Excluding the „Petershofen“ mine which was assigned to the Czechs under the treaty of Versailles, and which already before the war sent all the coal it produced to Bohemia.

<sup>2)</sup> According to the „Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich“.

	tons	tons
Alsace Lorraine . . . . .	11,131 000	
Sarre Valley . . . . .	5,800,000	
Schleswig-Holstein } . . . . .	600,000	
Eupen Malmedy }		
Poznanian . . . . .	2,598,000	
West Prussia (Polish), including Danzig .	1,537,000	
Luxemburg . . . . .	3,860,000	25,526,000
We must also reckon the consumption of coal by the war-fleet and by the merchant service as well as by the war industries working upon the armaments before the war. In this way we get a total decrease of consumption amounting to about . .		
		3,000,000
Should Upper Silesia be united to Poland we ought to add the consumption of coal for that province which, in 1913, amounted to . . . . .		
		<u>14,012 000</u>
Total . . . . .		42,538,000

It results from the above computation that the consumption of coal and coke by the territories which make up the present Germany amounted to 155,435,078 tons, minus 42,538,000 tons, that is to 112,897,078 tons.

The following figures show how much lignite was used in Germany in 1913:

	tons	tons
Produced in Germany . . . . .		87,233,084
plus the import		
1) Lignite . . . . .	6,987,064	
2) 120,965 tons of lignite briquettes expressed in terms of lignite . . . . .	362,895	7,349 959
		<u>94,583 043</u>
minus the lignite exported from Germany		
1) Lignite . . . . .	60,345	
2) 861,135 briquettes of lignite expressed in terms of lignite . . . . .	2,583,405	2,643,750
		<u></u>
Hence the consumption of lignite in Germany within its pre-war frontiers amounted (in 1913) to . . . . .		91,939,293
We must subtract the quantity of lignite consumed by the provinces lost by Germany . . . . .		1,300,000
Thus the consumption of lignite in 1913 by the provinces forming the present territory of Germany amounted to . .		90,639,293

These quantities of lignite expressed in terms of coal are equal to 27,191,788 tons of coal. The territories forming the present Germany, in consequence, consumed in 1913 the following quantities of coal:

	tons
Coal . . . . .	112,897,078
Lignite expressed in terms of coal . . . . .	27,191,788
Total . . . . .	<u>140,088,866</u>

In consequence of the treaty of Versailles Germany lost the coal-fields of Alsace Lorraine and of the Sarre, the production of which amounted in 1913 to:

	tons	tons
Alsace-Lorraine . . . . .	<u>3,817,000</u>	
The Sarre coal-field . . . . .	12,223,000	16,040,000
If Germany loses Upper Silesia these figures should be increased by the figures for the Upper Silesian production, that is to say by . . . . .		43,170,000
Total . . . . .		59,210,000
If from the figures representing the total production of coal in Germany, which, as we have seen, amounted in 1913 to		190,109,440
We subtract the figure representing the production of the lost coal-fields, and of Upper Silesia which amounts to . . . . .		<u>59,210,000</u>
there remains . . . . .		130,899,440

which represents the production of coal before the war in all the coal-fields which incontestably belonged to Germany.

In consequence of the fact that, according to the data which we possess, the amount of coal mined in Germany at present is 78% of the amount mined before the war, we get, as the figure representing the production of the German coal-fields, 102,100,000 tons. As to the lignite, its production has not only not decreased in Germany but has very considerably increased, so that it amounts to about 100,000,000 tons a year. This quantity expressed in terms of coal corresponds to 30,000,000 tons. Thus the total present production of coal and lignite (expressed in terms of coal) amounts to 132,100,000 tons. We must also add the amount of Upper Silesian coal imported into Germany which, during the first half of the year 1920 amounted to about 1,000,000 tons a month or 12,000,000 tons a year.

Thus Germany has at present at its disposal the following quantities of coal:

	tons
German coal . . . . .	102,100,000
Lignite (100,000,000 tons) expressed in terms of coal . . . . .	30,000,000
Upper Silesian coal . . . . .	<u>12,000,000</u>
Total . . . . .	144,000,000

If from this figure we subtract the contingents of coal delivered by Germany to the Allies in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, contingents which, in agreement with the decisions of the Spa Conference, amount to 2,000,000 tons a month, that is, to 24,000,000 tons a year, there remain 120,100,000 tons to cover the interior needs of Germany, that is to say, compared with the pre-war consumption, which amounted, as we have just shown, to 140,088,866 tons, nearly 86%. Further the fact must be noted that in 1919 and 1920, that is, since Poland became an independent State, her pre-war demand for coal has not been covered in any one month to more than a little over 50% of its full amount. There are very few states in western Europe which are developing economically in better circumstances than Germany, which are able to cover 86% of their pre-war demand.

	tons
If Germany succeeded in raising her production to the pre-war level, that is to . . . . .	130,899,000
then, counting the 100,000,000 tons of lignite equivalent to . . . . .	30,000,000
to which we must add the actual amount of Upper Silesian coal imported which amounts to . . . . .	12 000 000
we should get a figure of . . . . .	172,899,000
at the disposal of Germany.	

This total production would permit Germany, after having completely covered her needs as before the war (140,088,866 tons) and after having fulfilled her obligations towards the Allied Powers, to export fairly considerable quantities of coal.

Let us look a little more closely into the consumption of Upper Silesian coal and coke in 1913 by the provinces which constituted the then territory of Germany and compare it with the total consumption of the whole country.

The consumption of Upper Silesian coal and coke in Germany (not counting Upper Silesia) amounted in 1913 to the following figure:

	tons
Coal sent by rail from Upper Silesia into Germany . . . . .	13,468 699
Briquettes . . . . .	107,624
Coke (194,287 tons) expressed in terms of coal . . . . .	277,553
Total . . . . .	13,853,876
Plus the contingents sent by river from Koźle (Kosel) and Opole (Oppeln) . . . . .	2,265,801
	16,119,677
From this figure we must subtract the quantities sent to the territories ceded to Poland . . . . .	3,230,722
and the contingents sent to Danzig . . . . .	425,000
Remainder . . . . .	3,655,722
	12,463,955

In other words the consumption of Upper Silesian coal and coke by the territories which now make up Germany, amounted in 1913 to a total of 12,463,955 tons. This quantity, hardly represents 8.9% of the consumption of coal in Germany, before the war, (140,088,866 tons), whilst, as we have seen, the corresponding figure for Poland is as much as 40.4%.

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Przemysł Górniczy i Hutniczy\_w Królestwie Polskiem.

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# Handbuch

des

## Oberschlesischen Industriebezirks.

Als Band II der Festschrift zum  
XII. Allgemeinen Deutschen Bergmannstage in Breslau 1913

herausgegeben vom

Oberschlesischen Berg- und  
Hüttenmännischen Verein.

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Schriftleiter: Generalsekretär **Dr. Voltz**, Kattowitz.

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Mitarbeiter:

Bergrat **Ahrens**-Friedrichshütte, Direktor **Altpeter**-Berlin, **Dr. Bonikowsky**-Kattowitz, Bergassessor **Dr. Fiegel**-Berlin, Bergassessor a. D. **Dr. Gelsenheimer**-Kattowitz, Diplom-Bergingenieur **Gerke**-Bochum, Ober-Ingenieur **Heldepriem**-Kattowitz, Bergassessor **Hoffmann**-Kattowitz, Oberbergamts-Markscheider **Jahr**-Breslau, Bergrat **Knochenhauer**-Kattowitz, Redakteur **Kornaczowski**-Kattowitz, Professor **Dr. Michael**-Berlin, Knappschaftsdirektor Justizrat **Milde**-Tarnowitz, Geologe **Dr. Quitzow**-Berlin, Ober-Ingenieur **Sabaß**-Königshütte, Aufsichtführender Markscheider **Seeliger**-Zabrze, Bergassessor **Kurt Seldl**-Kattowitz, Bergwerksdirektor **Stähler**-Beuthen O.-S., Oberbergamts-Markscheider **Ulrich**-Breslau, Ober-Ingenieur **Vogel**-Kattowitz, Bergwerksdirektor **Woltersdorf**-Beuthen O.-S.

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Hierzu Karten-Anlagen I–VIII.

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Kattowitz 1913.

Selbstverlag des Oberschlesischen Berg- und Hütten-  
männischen Vereins, E. V.

The Monograph whose title is to be found on the preceeding page was published in 1913 by the Upper-Silesian League of Miners and Founders to commemorate the XII Congress of Miners in Wroclaw, (Breslau) and it therefore treats the economical situation of Upper Silesia independently from the new political conceptions, which arose during the time of the war and found expression in the secret German memorials of their economical Organization, as given in Supplement 8.

The proofs given in this Monograph confirm the neglect of the economical development of Upper Silesia under German rule, and bring forward the advantages to be gained by the joint economical dependence of Silesia on the other Polish lands.

Enclosed are data and tables, chosen from this Monograph, which characterize the conditions of the Silesian mines and founderies — their means of outlet, and their sources of obtaining supplies of iron-ore.

In making use of these data and tables, it is well to bear in mind that the authors of the "Monograph" often employ the word "Russia" instead of "Congress Poland" and the expression "Austro-Hungary" instead of "Galicia" — which is clearly understood by help of the text and which is explained by the fact that in 1913 those countries were annexed to Russia and Austro-Hungary respectively and the State of Poland did not exist.

#### Page 245.

### THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF UPPER SILESIA FOR GERMANY.

The importance of the Upper-Silesian mining industry is, both nationally and politically, very great, as its centre and field of action lies in a territory which, owing to national and political conditions, is in a difficult and threatened position. Upper Silesia is at present and shall be in future, one of the most important territories for Germany's struggle against "Great Poland". (Grosspolentum).

### GENERAL CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION IN THE MINES AND FOUNDERIES OF UPPER SILESIA.

#### Page 270.

The Upper Silesian mining-district borders on the Russian and Austro-Hungarian frontiers, between which it is incased, on a narrow strip of German territory. These states have the greatest importance for the outlet of the Upper-Silesian iron and coal products. For the distribution there of it is important that the Upper-Si-

lesian iron and coal strata reach with their tips as far as Poland and Galicia, Austrian Silesia and Morawia, on all of which teritoires the mining industry flourishes, competing with that of Upper Silesia.

The Polish mining-district in the Dąbrowa valley, comprises mines of pit-coal, zinc-ore and lead.

In Austrian-Silesia we find pit-coal as well as the production and manufacture of iron.

The competition of these districts is worthy of notice, but it cannot of itself form an outlet for the Upper-Silesian miningindustry in Russia or in Austria.

#### Page 272.

As regards the outlet in Russia, the conditions of the natural economical Upper-Silesian coal-mining industry, are even more favorable. First of all the quality of the Polish coal is inferior to that of Upper Silesia, and cannot be used as coke. Nor can the production of the Polish districts suffice to supply the needs of Congress Poland (des engeren Polen). And finally, beyond Poland lies a limitless extent of land absolutely bare of any mineral combustibles, reaching as far as the strata of pit-coal, which Russia possesses besides Poland, in the valleys of the Don, the Ural, the Moscow and Caucasian valleys.

#### Page 274.

It is true that Poland has in the districts of Piotrków, Kielce and Radom, numerous and rich strata of iron-ore, but as Polish coal cannot be used as coke, all the coke needed for its great iron-founderies must be brought over from Upper and Lower Silesia and from Morawska Ostrawa. A great part of the coal needed for the Polish iron-industry must be imported from abroad (especially the long-burning quality) i. e. from Upper Silesia. If, notwithstanding this, we admit that Polish iron-industry has as well natural-economical conditions of existence, then we can apply to the question of the outlet of the Upper-Silesian iron-products in Poland and Russia the same conclusions as above adopted to the outlet of the Upper-Silesian pit-coal in Russia. The production of the Polish iron-founderies is in any case too unimportant to hem in any way the outlet of Upper Silesia.

#### Page 278.

In general Upper Silesia supplies to day the need of coal in the whole of the Opole Regency, in more than half the regencies of Wroclaw and Lignic, in the province of Poznania and nearly the whole of Brandenburg, including Berlin not quite  $\frac{1}{2}$ , the provinces of Pommerania, and more or les the half of East and West Prussia.

#### Page 279.

The home-market as outlet for the Upper-Silesian coal and iron-industry is therefore prolonged, but the very narrow strip is all the more insufficient for this outlet as it comprises the least populous, and especially the least developped, industrial districts.

1-o. The Upper-Silesian mining-district has a far reaching and promising future: owing to its outlet in immediate connection with its founderies in the frontier-lands of Austria-Hungary and Russia, as well as its situation and sphere of influence of those districts holding competition.

2-o. The situation of the Upper-Silesian mining-industry in relation with the German outlet is inasmuch unfavorable as its products, for the mere getting out of its own narrow circuit, must cross broad areas. Its home-outlet in consequence is greatly prolonged and presents broad fields of action for the rival mining-districts, some of which possess important, in part predominating, capacity of production. Moreover Upper Silesia has not one natural, good, navigable water-way at its disposition, to cut through this extent of territory. Then too those districts able to hold competition with Upper Silesia can utilize the very convenient sea way, and get to the Upper-Silesian markets by the Northern route. This possibility of getting in has greatly influenced in these latter years the prices of transport by sea and water-ways leading from the sea-ports to the districts of Western Germany. By this, the home-outlet in Upper Silesia is markedly reduced on all sides and confined to provinces weakly populated, which owing to the small development of industry, have but little capacity for acquiring the mining products.

3-o. The consideration of the natural-economical conditions of consumption in the Upper-Silesian mining-industry shows that the conditions of outlet in Russia and Austro-Hungary are more advantageous for this industry and of greater importance than the home-consumption.

4-o. Conditions of outlet in the world's market are not advantageous for the Upper-Silesian industry.

The exclusion of the Russian market for Upper Silesia is of the greatest importance, as this exclusion means the loss of the outlet of its iron-industry, which for long years it held in unlimited possession and which constituted one of the principal basis of its existence and capacity of development.

The final result of the deliberation in the question of customs-politics is that the German commercial and customs-policy not only did not support the interests of the Upper-Silesian mining-industry, but even caused it much harm. First of all it influenced unfavorably the competition possibilities of that industry at home, almost entirely annulling the privileged position Upper Silesia had occupied previously in its relations with Western Germany, as to the cost of production. Then it supported the Russian and Austrian mining-industry in the exterior German markets, and above all nearly completely ousted the Upper-Silesian mining-industry from its most important markets: Russia and Austria.

## CONDITIONS OF OUTLET FOR THE COAL INDUSTRY.

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## Production of pit-coal.

UPPER - SILE S I A				D O R T M U N D		
Date	Total	1871 = 100%	Rank as to % in the general pro- duction of Germany	Total	1871 = 100%	Rank as to % in the general pro- duction of Germany
1871	6,532	100.0	22.2	12,715	100.0	43.3
1876	8,430	129.1	21.9	17,902	140.8	46.6
1881	10,368	158.7	21.3	23,645	186.0	48.6
1886	12,865	197.0	22.2	28,497	224.1	49.1
1891	17,730	271.4	24.1	37,402	294.2	50.7
1896	19,586	299.8	22.9	44,893	353.1	52.4
1901	25,251	386.6	23.3	58,448	459.7	53.8
1906	29,653	454.0	21.6	76,811	604.1	56.0
1909	34,657	530.6	23.3	82,804	651.2	55.7
1910	34,446	527.3	22.5	86,865	683.2	56.8
1911	36,623	560.7	22.8	91,329	718.3	56.8
1912	41,543	636.0	23.5	100,186	787.9	56.6

Page 340 — 341.

It is to the highest degree surprising that the districts of Upper Silesia, notwithstanding its great wealth in coal, notwithstanding the favorable conditions of production and notwithstanding the well-known excellency of its coal, should have obtained a far smaller advantage from the development and expansion of Germany's economical rule than the Ruhr district, and consequently remained far behind the same in its development.

Page 350.

## Consumption of Upper Silesian coal, coke and briquettes.

Date	Consumption in the home markets			Consumption abroad		
	1000 t.	1887=100	% of general consumption	1000 t.	1887=100	% of general consumption
1887	6,603	100.0	75.7	2,124	100.0	24.3
1892	8,581	130.0	75.7	2,753	129.6	24.3
1897	9,999	151.4	69.0	4,483	211.1	31.0
1902	12,246	185.5	70.7	5,078	239.1	29.3
1907	15,644	236.9	66.4	7,907	372.3	33.6
1911	16,973	257.0	63.6	9,708	457.1	36.4

The extraordinary increase of export abroad took place notwithstanding the fact that the greatest of the foreign markets for the Upper-Silesian product, i. e. Russia, was artificially hemmed by the levying of a high duty on the export of coal from Upper Silesia, and even more — the development of industry was hemmed as well as the consumption of coal in Russia.

Upper Silesia sends almost all its foreign export to Austro-Hungary and to Russia.

Pages 353 — 354.

The greater part of the consumption of coal from Upper Silesia in Russia, is confined to Congress Poland, where the iron-industry and widely developed wool-len-industry in Warsaw, Lodz and Częstochowa, as also the gas-factories, sugar-refineries etc. employ an important quantity of the Upper-Silesian coal. The consumption in Poland <sup>1)</sup>, including coke, and briquettes, amounted to:

Date	1.000 t.	1887=100
1887. . . . .	191	100.0
1892. . . . .	139	72.8
1894. . . . .	207	108.4
1897. . . . .	373	195.3
1902. . . . .	620	324.6
1907. . . . .	843	441.4
1911. . . . .	1283	671.7

In comparison with the remarkable development of foreign export, the development of the Upper-Silesian consumption at home by rail-way seems very small. As already mentioned it increased only 157% during the years 1887—1911, whereas foreign export increased 357% (and to Congress Poland, 571%).

<sup>\*)</sup> viz. Congress Poland

## Page 363.

**Consumption of pit-coal and briquettes in Berlin**  
(excluding the important sources of supplies).

Date	General sum of consumption		In the general sum of consumption, there came from:					
			England		Westphalia		Upper Silesia	
	Tons	= 1890 100	Tons	= 1890 100	Tons	= 1890 100	Tons	= 1890 100
1890	1,406,961	100.0	105,894	100.0	84,288	100.0	1,021,220	100.0
1894	1,458,198	103.6	189,304	178.8	84,917	100.7	963,310	94.3
1898	1,693,400	120.3	285,563	269.7	175,531	208.3	1,019,258	99.8
1902	1,761,904	125.2	328,784	310.5	169,419	201.0	1,015,273	99.4
1906	2,036,702	144.8	481,031	454.2	253,186	300.1	1,116,291	109.3
1907	2,332,323	165.7	726,290	685.9	278,005	329.8	1,119,861	109.7
1908	2,240,324	159.2	810,630	765.5	261,434	310.2	979,088	95.9
1909	2,372,310	168.6	946,102	893.4	293,231	347.9	964,873	94.5
1910	2,158,582	153.5	841,078	794.2	282,098	334.6	863,355	84.5
1911	2,062,198	146.6	813,286	768.0	265,097	314.5	778,278	76.2

## Pages 366 — 367.

The part taken by the Upper-Silesian coal in East-Germany, excepting Brandenburg without Berlin, as also East and West Prussia without the ports, has decreased in every district, most remarkably in Berlin, Königsberg and Pommerania and the sea-ports of Pommerania. In Berlin the absolute consumption of Upper-Silesian coal has diminished.

The coal of Upper Silesia possesses in some degree the assured possibility of an outlet only in the provinces of Poznań and Wrocław; furthermore — but already against strong competition — in East and West Prussia, which (excluding the ports in Pommerania) have no ports. The conditions of an outlet in the Wrocław Regency are much less favorable (Wrocław excepted) in which those coal-districts in competition with Upper-Silesia, have the predominance.

## Page 372.

The development of the consumption of the Upper-Silesian coal in Berlin presents a catastrophical picture, as the consumption of the coal from Upper Silesia shows not only a proportionally gigantic decrease, but an absolute decrease in the quantity.

## Page 373.

The conditions of an outlet for Upper-Silesian coal in "Gross-Berlin" (Berlin and its suburbs are equally unfavorable, only that there at least the consumption of Silesian coal has suffered no marked diminution.

## The importance of the Polish market for Upper-Silesian coke.

Pages 387—388.

The greater half of the Upper-Silesian coke is sent abroad by rail: in 1911—52,7<sup>0</sup>/<sub>0</sub>, in 1910—45,4<sup>0</sup>/<sub>0</sub>, in 1899—53<sup>0</sup>/<sub>0</sub>. The most important foreign purchaser of Upper-Silesian coke is Congress Poland, especially its iron-industry, which, notwithstanding the high import duty (3 marks per ton) must cover all its needs abroad, as Polish coal is absolutely deprived of the property of being converted into coke.

## Page 388.

Upper Silesia sent to Poland (Congress Poland) in 1911 — 213,690 tons, or 65,07<sup>0</sup>/<sub>0</sub> of the general coke export. To Russia (not including Poland) 442 tons or 0,13<sup>0</sup>/<sub>0</sub>; to Austro-Hungary 112,714 tons, or 34,30<sup>0</sup>/<sub>0</sub> (this includes 52,938 tons for Galicia, 24,017 tons for Hungary, 2,388 tons for Bohemia and 33,371 tons for the other Austro-Hungarian lands).

## CONDITIONS OF IRON-INDUSTRY IN UPPER SILESIA.

Sources of the iron-ore manufactured by the Upper Silesian foundries.

Page 395.

Date	General consumption		From Upper Silesia		
	Tons	1891 = 100	Tons	1891 = 100	% of general consumption
1891	871,425	100.0	708,654	100.0	81.3
1895	902,109	103.5	604,272	85.3	67.0
1899	1,104,576	126.8	536,074	75.6	48.6
1903	1,028,446	118.0	420,629	59.4	40.9
1907	1,208,053	138.6	292,077	41.2	24.2
1911	1,120,213	128.6	251,682	35.5	22.5

Date	From Germany			From abroad		
	Tons	1891 = 100	% of gen. consumpt.	Tons	1891 = 100	% of gen. consumpt.
1891	33,311	100.0	3.8	129,460	100.0	14.9
1895	34,584	103.8	3.8	263,253	203.3	29.2
1899	41,184	123.6	3.7	527,318	407.3	47.7
1903	55,041	165.2	5.4	552,776	427.0	53.7
1907	129,603	389.1	10.7	786,373	607.4	65.1
1911	155,253	466.1	13.8 <sup>1)</sup>	713,278	551.0	63.7

**Pages 396—397.**

Iron-ore imported by the Upper-Silesian foundries from outside the boundaries of Upper Silesia, in 1911.

	<u>Tons</u>	<u>%</u>	
Import from abroad . . . . .	713,278	82.1	
Import from the interior . . . . .	155,253	17.9	
Of this foreign import fall to the share of:			
	<u>Tons</u>	<u>% of general import</u>	<u>% of foreign import</u>
Austro-Hungary . . . . .	123,997	14.3	17.4
Russia . . . . .	273,687	31.5	38.3
Sweden et Norway . . . . .	305,043	35.1	42.8
Other countries . . . . .	10,551	1.2	1.5

Of the import from the interior falls to the share of:

	Tons	% of Import from the interior
Lower and Middle Silesia . . . . .	40,506	26.1
Poznanian . . . . .	82,168	52.9
Saxony and Thuringia . . . . .	23,991	15.5
Other countries . . . . .	8,588	5.5

**Page 400.**

The Iron Industry of Upper-Silesia could only in a relatively small degree profit by the foreign sources for obtaining iron-ore as the cost of import was too unfavorable for the Silesian Industry.

<sup>1)</sup> Of this 7.3% for Poznanian and hardly 65% for Germany, as can be seen on the following table.

## Page 404.

Russian Poland possesses great and rich strata of iron-ore in the immediate neighborhood of Upper Silesia, which might very easily supply the Upper Silesian foundries, owing to the low freight — prices with very cheap fuel, if only the Russian duty on iron did not impel the building of foundries in Poland, which exploit the iron—strata for themselves.

## Page 407.

## The Upper Silesian production of pig-iron.

Date	In Germany and Luxenburg		In Upper Silesia			
	Tons	1871=100	Tons	1871=100	% of general production	1871=100
1871	1,563,682	100.0	231,846	100.0	14.8	100.0
1876	1,846,345	118.1	223,705	96.5	12.1	81.8
1881	2,914,009	186.4	327,651	141.3	11.2	75.7
1886	3,528,657	225.7	372,875	160.8	10.6	71.6
1891	4,641,217	296.8	479,806	206.9	10.3	69.6
1896	6,372,575	407.5	616,028	265.7	9.7	65.5
1901	7,880,088	503.9	641,726	276.8	8.1	54.7
1906	12,478,067	798.0	901,306	388.8	7.2	48.6
1909	12,917,653	826.1	849,776	366.5	6.6	44.6
1910	14,793,325	946.1	901,366	388.8	6.1	41.2
1911	15,534,223	993.4	963,382	415.5	6.2	41.9
1912	17,829,634	1,140.0	1,048,356	451.7	5.9	39.8

## Page 408.

The production of pig-iron seems particularly low when compared to the expansion of the same in the whole of Germany during the same space of time.

## Conditions for the Upper Silesian Iron Industry.

## Page 429.

Percentage of the Upper-Silesian coal as in use:

	Silesia without the Opole regency	Poznanla	Berlin	Brandenburg	Saxony
1884	63.7%	44.7%	19.7%	15.6%	16.6%
1911	55.2%	35.7%	14.5%	12.8%	12.2%

## Page 430.

The acuteness of competition, with which the iron-industry of Upper Silesia has to contend on its markets at home, and more especially the competition of the Western and Southern German districts, which was already demonstrated in the general-economical part of this work, is clearly exposed to the light of day in the above comparison. Even in the Province of Silesia, which constitutes the real home-market for the Upper-Silesian iron-industry, that industry does not cover much more than half the import; in that province and in Poznań, which in consequence of its general situation indisputably tends towards Upper Silesia, the import from Silesia amounts to hardly more than the third part of the general import. In all the other parts of the State, the import of iron from Upper Silesia does not surpass 15% of the general import.

## Page 433.

In general one cannot but recognize that the state of the Upper Silesia iron-industry is very serious. However it is not incurable, as the difficult circumstances, which caused it are disappearing—as is proved in all the foregoing statements—not from any specially unfavorable natural conditions of production and outlets for that industry, nor from any necessities imposed by nature itself. These obstacles are rather the result of a series of prejudicial regulations for the Upper-Silesian districts or neglect on the part of German political-economy.

## Conditions for supplying Upper Silesia with pork-meat.

## Page 250.

The demands of the Upper-Silesian working population for meat, are principally concentrated on pork-meat—especially of the fattest kind which the people absolutely need not only as the best preparation for their food-articles (potatoes and cabbage), but also owing to health considerations resulting from their kind of work. Nevertheless the breeding of swine on the territories of that province which are adaptable economically, is relatively unimportant.

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According to the registry of cattle, of December 1-st, 1908, the province of Silesia, in comparison with its superficies had the least number of swine of all Prussian provinces, i. e. only 269,57 to the 1,000 ha. of superficies—whereas the average number in the State amounted to 384,83. The province of Poznań with 336,52 swine to the 1,000 ha. ranks considerably lower than the average numbers in the land. The same can be said of all Eastern provinces, whereas the average numbers of the Western provinces in Germany are considerably higher. Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover and Westphalia count considerably more than 500 swine to the 1,000 ha.

## Page 251.

The quality of their porks does not answer the demands of the Upper-Silesian working class—which, as already mentioned, requires meat and lard of fat porks—like those fattened in Russia <sup>1)</sup> and in the interior, only in small quantities.

## Page 264.

## Conditions of supplying Upper Silesia with timber.

Import of timber by rail	From the interior	O F T H I S						
		From the re- gency of Wrocław an Opole	From foreign parts	<sup>2)</sup> From Poland	From Russia	From Galicia	From Hungary	From the rest of Austria
Tiber for constru- ction . . . . .	8,614	7,418	125,944	34,943	5,856	67,562	4,252	13,060
Tiber for use . . . .	11,384	7,033	72,843	20,325	3,992	34,846	4,169	9,223
Timber for fuel . . .	48,601	43,829	226,360	68,239	21,830	118,911	1,851	15,368
Total . . . . .	68,599	58,280	425,147	123,507	31,678	221,319	10,272	37,651

## Page 265.

For Upper Silesia, which is obliged to satisfy the greater part of its demands in foreign parts, and which, in consequence of its unfavorable conditions of transport can do so only in the neighbouring territories of Russia and Austro-Hungary, the duty on timber is equivalent to a rise in prices as high as the duty—as well interiorly as exteriorly. The Western German districts, on the contrary, are able to cover 85% of their demand in timber from their forest-lands and thanks to their central position and convenient water-comunication with all parts of the world, have the choice among a whole series of countries producing timber for the covering of their unimportant shortage. That is why these districts are able in a great measure, to shove custom-duties on the shoulders of others, either on the producers or on the numerous intermediaries taking part in the transport by sea or by the water-ways of the interior.

<sup>1)</sup> as seen in the secret memorials the German economical organization and the statistics of the „pork trade“ (supplement 9) the word Russia is used here for Poland.

<sup>2)</sup> Vis Congress Poland.

*Lms. 7. 5. 17.*



Streng vertraulich.

# Das Interesse Oberschlesiens an der Zukunft Polens.

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Überreicht durch

die Handelskammer für den Regierungsbezirk Oppeln  
in Oppeln.

Der Vorsitzende:

Berggrat Dr. Ing. h. c. **Wittiger-Kattowitz.**

Der Syndikus:

Landrichter a. D. v. **Stoephasius.**

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**Oppeln,**

Juli 1917.

These **secret memorials** the German title of which has been photographed and placed on the preceding page was presented by the German industrial organisations of Upper Silesia during the war to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. These memorials published as "very confidential" and sealed with the German official seal were found by the Polish government after the evacuation by the Germans in the archives of the Imperial Mining Office at Częstochowa.

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# The Upper Silesian Mining and Foundry Association.

Katowice (Kattowitz), September 3, 1916.

Journal No A. 1378.

Concerning the purchasing of iron ore, of  
old iron and of wood for mining, in Poland  
for Upper Silesia.

Your Excellency!

We have the honour as the accredited representatives of the whole Upper-Silesian mining industry to most humbly present the following memorial.

The newspapers, and especially the Austrian ones, inform us that the allied empires intend to solve the Polish question by forming an independent Polish Kingdom. As this information has not hitherto been contradicted by the ruling spheres, we must presume that it is correct.

The creation of an independent Polish State touches the most vital interests of the Upper-Silesian mining industry. In the memorial worked out in common by the undersigned Union and by the Chamber of Commerce of the Oppeln (Opole) district and entitled "Economic Relations between Russian Poland and the German Federation and their consequences at the conclusion of peace" we set forth in detail the requirements which we shall bring forward when the political and economic conditions of the Polish parts of the country are arranged anew. Then, in the memorial issued by the undersigned Union and entitled "The mining industry in the Kingdom of Poland" a detailed account was given of the importance of the mines of Poland. Both these memorials were presented to your Excellency but we take the liberty most humbly to enclose them herewith.

We do not know what parts of former Russian Poland are to be included in the new Polish State. It results from the above-mentioned memorials that for the Upper Silesian mining industry and for German economic life in general it would be very important if at least the territories bordering on Upper Silesia, and especially the Bendzin district, as well as parts of the Olkusz, Czenstochowa and Wielun districts were joined to the German Federation. If, however, that could not be done, at any rate the transport of different indispensable raw materials, both during the war and after the war, from Poland to Silesia, should be secured, so that our industry should be able to meet the demands made of it in the interests of home defence.

The most important question is that of the supply of Polish iron for the Upper Silesian foundries. This ore usually appears in the form of ferruginous loam, turf ore and brown ore. The beds of ferruginous loam ore are chiefly found in the Wielun, and Czenstochowa, districts. Since these kinds of ore are found very near the surface of the earth, their extraction is easy. They contain in a raw state from 25% to 36% of iron, although by exposing for a long time to intense heat this percentage may be increased to 34% and even to 48%.

The brown iron is found chiefly in the Bendzin district and then in the Radom and Kielce governments and is, generally speaking, similar to the same kind of Upper Silesian ore in the Upper Silesian industrial district, in the neighbourhoods of

**Tarnow and Bytom.** The amount of iron contained in these ores in a dry condition amounts on an average to 30%. The most usual kind of ore in Poland is the turf ore, which lies near the surface of the earth in very many places and often over a considerable area, for instance in the Warsaw, Kalisz, Piotrków and Radom governments. These ores contain on an average from 30% to 40% of iron. These ores have not, hence, a high percentage of iron, but they are, for the foundries, a very valuable and useful material. Besides this there are also in Poland high percentage ores such as the red iron ore and the specially valuable manganite ore which is found in the central Polish mountains in the Kielce government. These ores are found in territory which is temporarily occupied by the Austrians. It must be further mentioned that in Russian Poland there is a considerable percentage of slag which contains from 30% to 43% of iron. This slag also is very desirable material for the foundries.

According to a fairly certain geological estimate Poland should possess a total of from 300,000,000 to 600,000,000 of tons of iron ore. Naturally some of this ore is not suitable for use in foundries either because of the small amount of iron it contains or for other reasons, but in any case the amount of ore existing in Poland is very considerable.

The annual amount of Polish ore mined up to the outbreak of the war was only about 300,000 tons since the Polish foundries had nothing to gain by a production exceeding their own demand and a larger export to Upper Silesia was rendered impossible by an order forbidding the export of ore which was issued some years ago by the Russian authorities.

After the occupation of Poland by our troops and since the German administration was organized in Poland, the Polish iron ore has been exploited by the Upper Silesian foundries and chiefly loam ore brown ore and slag are mined.

For the mining of this material His Excellency the Chief of the Administration in Warsaw has created the Limited Guarantee Ore Exploitation Company at Kattowitz (Katowice), (Erzverwertungsgesellschaft mit b. H in Kattowitz), which has joined the undersigned Association and is composed of all the Upper Silesian foundries with the exception of the united Royal and Laura foundries, which, for special reasons, could not take part for the time being in the import of Polish ores.

This Company does not aim at any profit and only resells according to its own costs the ore and iron for smelting to the Upper Silesian establishments which have been bought or acquired by itself. In the year 1916 this Company sent to Upper Silesia nearly 200,000 tons of ore and other material for smelting and most of this was requisitioned material which at the outbreak of the war was deposited in the Polish foundries and which was handed over to this Company by the Chief of the Administration.

In that same year the "Erzverwertungsgesellschaft" itself took over the exploitation of the Polish ore and slag, to a large extent. According to our estimate the transport of Polish ore and slag by the "Erzverwertungsgesellschaft" to Upper Silesia will amount in 1917 to about 250,000 tons. It follows from this that, the amount mined is only slightly less than the amount mined before the war. Since the amount of material for smelting used in 1916 by the Upper Silesian establishments with large furnaces amounted to about 1,600,000 tons of ore and slag, hence the proportion of Polish material included in that amount was 16%.

The Upper Silesian foundries are engaged almost exclusively in the manufacture of articles for use in the war—hence it is very important that they should re-

ceive during the war the indispensable amount of material for smelting. It results from the above that the amount of native Upper Silesian ore used within recent years is very small. But since other districts containing iron ore are a considerable distance off, Upper Silesia has been obliged also during the war to import chiefly foreign ores, namely Swedish and Austro-Hungarian.

But since the war broke out Austro-Hungary forbade the export of iron ore and only from time to time permits the free export of small quantities. The import of Swedish ore is also rendered very difficult by the dangers to be met with on the Baltic Sea. Hence it would be desirable that after the creation of an independent Polish State it should also be permitted to the Upper Silesian foundries to export Polish ore since otherwise these foundries will not be able to fulfil the requirements of the War Administration.

In any case the continued supply of Polish ore to the foundries during the war is an absolute necessity; but also after the conclusion of peace it would be extremely important for the Upper Silesian iron industry to continue to receive Polish ore as no other foundry district has so many difficulties to struggle with in regard to obtaining ore, and that even in time of peace, as the Upper Silesian district.

The beds of iron ore in Upper Silesia which in the XVIII century inspired Frederick the Great to found the iron industry here, are now for the most part exhausted. In 1915 the whole amount mined amounted to 148,000 tons or 9.5% of the total Upper Silesian demand for ore. Thus the whole amount of iron smelted in Upper Silesia which was 1,095,000 tons consisted of 576,000 tons which came from abroad, that is chiefly from Sweden, Norway and Austro-Hungary; of 179,000 tons from Upper Silesia itself and of 340,000 tons from other German districts. Hence most of Upper Silesia's demand had to be covered from abroad. This fact is very disadvantageous for the Upper Silesian iron industry for two reasons: first of all because the smelting material from abroad is, on account of the considerable distance from which it must be brought, extremely dear for the Upper Silesian district and then because dependence upon countries abroad has a bad effect, and that, as we have already seen during this war, a considerable one, on the supply of ore. And it is an important matter in the interests of the State and of the Army to keep the Upper Silesian foundries going.

First of all every weakening of the Upper Silesian iron industry should be avoided because of the 40,000 workmen employed in it and of their families. Then, the fall of the Upper Silesian foundry industry and what follows, of the coal industry, as the most important customer for coal is the iron industry, would lead to the fall of all industrial and economic life in Upper Silesia.

But the Upper Silesian foundries have a special importance for home defence on account of the fact that, as we have seen during the war, the west-German foundry industry was not in a position to supply the German army with the indispensable war material. Without the Upper Silesian foundry industry the production of arms, ammunition and other manufactured articles necessary for the war, would have been insufficient.

And hence first of all in the interests of the army, the Upper Silesian iron industry ought to be kept going and that would only be possible if the Upper Silesian foundries could continue to receive ore from the Polish mines also after the war. This

explains the joyful greeting by the Upper Silesian foundries of the news that the Polish ore territories had been occupied by the German troops.

The Chief of the Administration in Warsaw supported our efforts to get a supply of ore, for which gratitude is due to him. The "Erzverwertungsgesellschaft" received from the Chief of the Administration in Warsaw the right to require a supply of iron ore and later on an order was given forbidding trading in mining concessions for ore, with the exception however of those transactions projected in favour of our Company. Taking advantage of this law the Company developed a very extensive activity in the direction of searching for ore and is now negotiating for the purchase of different concessions.

For all these reasons it is desirable that also after the creation of a free Polish State the rights acquired by the Upper Silesian foundries should be left to them and also that the Upper Silesian foundries should have a right to purchase mining property equally with Polish citizens. The transport and purchase of iron ore should also not be rendered difficult by fiscal, tariff or other state regulations. The Upper Silesian foundries from time to time receive from Poland yet another raw material, the import of which ought to be secured at least as long as the war lasts. This raw material is old iron, usually called refuse or "smeltings".

The old iron is, as well as raw iron, the chief material employed in the manufacture of steel by the Siemens-Martin process. Since in Upper Silesia the greater part of the steel is made in just this way, hence the need for old iron is very considerable. The amount of old iron received from home sources has decreased immensely during the war so that there is much lacking in this respect, and besides the demand of Austro-Hungary for old iron during the war has to be covered. For this reason difficulties are foreseen by the Upper Silesian foundries with regard to the supply of old iron for the manufacture of steel. The Upper Silesian steel manufacturing factories are also exclusively for the time being manufacturing war material. For this reason His Excellency the Chief of the Administration handed over the whole amount of old iron in Poland to the Upper Silesian foundries and authorized its division by the "Limited Guarantee Company for the use of old iron" (Alteisen-Verwertungsgesellschaft m. b. H.) which is also united to the undersigned Association.

This company is also under the control of the Chief of the Administration and is composed of all the Upper Silesian steel manufacturing factories. The old iron purchased by this Company is sold at cost price, without profit, to the above-mentioned steel manufacturing factories.

It results from the above-mentioned facts that the obtaining of old iron from Poland for the Upper Silesian steel manufacturing factories is in general of great importance, especially during the war, for the military administration.

After the conclusion of peace the old iron in Poland ought to go first of all to supply the needs of the Polish steel manufacturing factories which are to be set going. We may foresee that until Polish industrial activity develops the amount of old iron will increase to such a degree that the Polish foundries will not be able to use up the whole supply. We therefore most humbly beg that the unhindered purchase of the old iron from Poland in the future also may be facilitated.

Wood for the mines has for a long period been brought in from Russian Poland. The demand of the Upper Silesian mines for wood amounts to about 1,000,000 cubic metres annually. As the home forests could not supply that amount, about

the half or it had to be brought in from abroad. Before the outbreak of the war about 250,000 cubic metres of wood were brought in from Galicia and Poland.

On account of the temporary occupation of Galicia by the Russian troops, Galician forestry greatly declined, hence the home material there is used for the needs of the province itself, for the reconstruction of buildings in ruined localities. In consequence of this the amount of wood brought in from Galicia during the war has immensely decreased and also after the war for a certain time it will be difficult to reckon on the Upper Silesian mines being able to import this material in the large quantities spoken of above.

The providing of the Upper Silesian mines with wood has also been rendered difficult during the two years of the war by the fact that the cutting of home wood considerably decreased owing to the lack of hands. Since wood was an indispensable material for work in mines it was necessary to make up the lacking quantity of wood. For this purpose there was called into being, on the initiative of the Royal Prussian Ministry of War, an eastern institution for the supply of wood, under the title of a Limited Guarantee Company: "Holzbeschaffungsstelle Ost, Gesellschaft m. b. H." at Katowice, which is also in union with the undersigned Association. This Company is made up of the boards of the Upper Silesian mines and has no other purpose than the common advantage. His Excellency the Chief of the Administration in Warsaw put into the hands of this Company the whole amount of wood to be cut in the government woods as long as the civil administration continued to exist in Poland, and this amount of wood is as much as about 300,000 cubic metres annually. As Controller of the work of the Company, there entered into its Superintending Council the Director of the German Forestry Board in Warsaw, Dr. Laspeyres, Head Forester.

Besides the wood from the governmental forests the Upper Silesian mines received a considerable quantity of Polish wood from private forests, through certain private firms. Without Polish wood it would be impossible to carry on mining in the Upper Silesian mines during the war to so great an extent, and it need not be proved that the decrease of production in the mines would have a very bad effect on the defence of the country. We shall only briefly mention here that not only the whole of eastern Germany is supplied with Upper Silesian coal, but also the eastern territory occupied by our troops and finally the allied states of Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Just for this reason the military authorities, and especially the War Office, are very greatly interested in the maintenance of Upper Silesian coal mining and therefore arrangements should be made against the decrease of the import of wood from Poland, as, from what we have said above it results that Upper Silesia does not receive the same quantity of wood from Galicia as it did before the war and it is doubtful if it can obtain any from other countries.

We have the honour, at the conclusion of our memorial, to repeat once more in the form of a short precis the conclusions arrived at above.

1. The supply of Polish ore to the Upper Silesian foundries ought to be secured, also after the creation of an independent Polish State, as well during the war as after the conclusion of peace. In particular the export of ore from Poland to Upper Silesia should not be rendered difficult or restrained by the legislative or executive authorities.

2. The rights given to the Upper Silesian foundries to get concessions for mining iron ore ought to be continued in force even after the retirement of the civil administration from Warsaw.

3. When complete freedom of mining is introduced into Poland the Upper Silesian foundries ought to have a right to purchase mining properties on an equality with Polish citizens. In case of general freedom of mining not being introduced in Poland there ought to be left in force the rights to mining concessions given to the Upper Silesian foundries by the Chief of the Administration in Warsaw.

4. The exploitation of the mines and the transport of the ore and slag ought not to be hindered or made impossible for the Upper Silesian foundries by taxes, a tariff or other governmental regulations.

5. The import of old iron from Poland by the Company for the Use of Old Iron for the Upper Silesian steel manufactories, should be further permitted.

6. During the continuance of the war there ought to be supplied from Poland for the "Holzbeschaffungsstelle-Ost" wood from the government woods in accordance with the conditions laid down by the Chief of the Administration in Warsaw, that is, 300,000 cubic metres of wood annually.

7. After the war also there ought to be permitted and secured the export from Poland of wood for the mines in Upper Silesia.

We are ready at any time, should Your Excellency require it, to give further explanations.

#### THE UPPER SILESIA MINING AND FOUNDRY ASSOCIATION.

(Signed) Williger  
Chairman.

(Signed) Dr. Geisenheimer  
Secretary.

of the Opole district.

- Journal No. 11563.

Your Excellency!

Some time ago we published a memorial worked out by the Chamber of Commerce with the aid of the Mining and Foundry Union. This memorial was entitled "Economic relations between Russian Poland and the German Federation and their consequences at the conclusion of peace" and in it we took up attitude towards the Polish question and we expressed the wishes of Upper Silesia in connection with the future economic constitution of Poland.

The negotiations with Austro-Hungary concerning the future of Poland seem to be approaching their conclusion. Beyond the notes which have occasionally appeared no news has reached us so that we do not know accurately in what way the Polish question is to be solved. But on account of the extensive interests which, as Your Excellency knows, our district, in the very nature of things, has in the future constitution of the adjacent districts of Russian Poland, we beg as the official representatives of the industries and trade of the district to be allowed to briefly recount once more to your Excellency the following desires of Upper Silesia.

We put in the first place the wish that Upper Silesia should be at last set free from the economic restraint to which it has been subject, and which is the result of its geographical and political position, as this is the source and the substance of all the complaints of our district. If even there were a hope that the oft-repeated effort after an economic union with Austro-Hungary might lead after the war to an increased mutual exchange of goods with those two states, the foreseen export of goods to Austria Hungary will always be limited by the natural desire of that state to improve and strengthen its own industries and thus can never make up for Upper Silesia's and in general for Germany's export to a country which is culturally so backward as Russian Poland. We make bold here to recall to your memory the contents of our memorial in which we went more particularly into this question of the long-existing relations between Upper Silesian industries and trade and Russian Poland.

In our memorial we expressed a wish for the economic union of Poland to Germany, which wish was the natural result of the close relations between Upper Silesia and Russian Poland. If the advantage of Upper Silesia is in question, then the union to it of Poland or especially of its southern districts, is an absolute necessity.

But we still hope that the solution of the Polish question in union with Austro-Hungary will permit of the taking into consideration of Silesian interests. If, however, for political or other reasons, there cannot be that union which we wish of parts of Poland to Germany, in one form or another, and the more if the plan which was published in the press of making the Kingdom of Poland independent should be carried out, the question of the fixing of duties between Germany and that new State must arise. We touched upon this question in our memorial and

we indicated that in case Russian Poland were to be fiscally included in Germany it would be absolutely necessary to aim at keeping the Russian market for a number of years for certain branches of Polish industry, and that for the purpose of avoiding their harmful competition with the same branches of German industry. We have no wish here to declare our own particular attitude towards the fiscal question, but we would remark that the first thing to be done is to incorporate Poland into the German fiscal system in the way mentioned above. This ought to be given preference over the concluding of a separate agreement with independent Poland. In case, however, of the incorporation of the newly formed Kingdom of Poland into the German fiscal system being impossible, we must presume that we shall yet be given the opportunity of defining our attitude towards the fiscal agreement which is to be made for defending the multifarious interests of Upper Silesia.

But in this case we should wish to remark in a general way that if all possibility of finding a market in Poland is not to be taken away from the German industries, when the Polish fiscal tariffs are being worked out it is the German duties and not the Austrian ones which should be taken as a basis, these latter being in many cases high. This also applies even in case of the worst solution of the question considered in our memorial, even in case a part of Russian Poland should be joined to Austria or at any rate incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian fiscal system. It is quite clear that the exchange of goods with those parts of Poland where a duty so high as the Austrian one was exacted would be absolutely impossible, just as at present the export to Austro-Hungary of heavy manufactured articles and machines as well as a whole series of the manufactured articles turned out by another industry, has been rendered impossible. In consequence of this, in connection with the union of parts of Poland to Austro-Hungary, measures should be taken which would make possible there the action of German capital and intelligence and which would, by means of a protective duty, facilitate German industries finding a market for their manufactures in Poland.

Besides the possibility of finding an unrestrained market for the products of the industries of our district in Russian Poland and the settlement of the question of the tariffs, there are also the following principal points with which the interests of our district are closely connected.

1. It is indispensable that we should be assured free export into and import from Russian Poland by means of the exclusive possession of the chief railways.
2. The continuous import of ores and wood from Poland into Upper Silesia should be maintained.
3. The import into Germany of food stuffs from Russian Poland should be maintained at its former level.

1. As concerns the assurance of complete liberty of export into Russian Poland, may we be allowed to refer to the detailed proof in our memorial of the importance for German industries of the firm keeping in our hands of at any rate the most important railways from Germany to Poland and the abolition of tariff restraints. We would call your attention to the fact that, unlike Austria, which has only one railway to Poland, seven railways lead from Germany into Poland, and that for the attaining of the end at which we aim, we ought, as well as taking possession of the Warsaw—Vienna railway, to secure for ourselves influence also over the Nadwislanski railway through Demblin. These arguments in our memorial were

set forth specially in case a part of Poland were to be united to Austro-Hungary. In that case it would be absolutely necessary to eliminate the possibility of Austrian influence upon our export, at any rate on those railways, and also to secure our transport through the whole of Poland against foreign and harmful action. This same principle of the keeping of at least the two above-named railways fast in German hands should also be applied in case Poland became an independent Kingdom. In that case the getting control of the chief railways would have a great importance for German industries.

2. As concerns the question of the assurance to Upper Silesia in the future of a sufficient quantity of ore and wood, so as to avoid repeating ourselves we refer you to the report of the Miners' and Foundrymen's Association at Katowice (Kattowitz), which report was addressed to Your Excellency. We absolutely concur in the arguments used in that report and we should wish once more to point out what a great importance has the security for importing ores and wood for the Upper Silesian industries, in the first instance during the time of war and also later, after the conclusion of peace.

The conclusions set forth in the report of the Mining and Foundry Association are also our conclusions.

3. The regulation of the transport from Russian Poland of food stuffs has a special importance for our district. In our memorial we sketched the plan of acquiring new agricultural territories mentioning this as a fundamental point, which would mean that it is necessary that Russian Poland should be economically united to Germany, and that for the purpose of making the better feeding of our nation than during this war, in the future independent of countries abroad. Russian Poland, with its valuable earth, which, with a rational application of modern agricultural technique, might yield a much greater surplus, would be a very suitable colony for us. As a province which must import, our district is especially interested in the union of the neighbouring border districts, as Upper Silesia, in consequence of its lack of a sufficient expanse of its own food-supplying territory for its dense population, had to rely in many respects upon Russian Poland, which played the part of a natural "Hinterland".

We should like, first of all, to point to the necessity of exporting pigs from Poland to Upper Silesia.

The demand of the Upper Silesian industrial district for pigs could not be covered even in time of peace by home production, not to mention the fact that the German pigs do not suit the working population which specially esteems the fat pigs, giving them plenty of bacon, which come from Poland. The allowable annual contingent to be imported into Upper Silesia according to article 214 of the addition of July 28/15, 1904 to the German-Russian commercial agreement, amounted to 130,000 pigs or 2,500 head a week. Meantime, however, from October 1912 to the end of 1913 this number was increased to 3,075 head per week, as during that period, on account of the extraordinary rise in the price of meat the provisioning of the industrial district was rendered specially difficult. The transport of swine into Upper Silesia was conducted through the Russian frontier market at Sosnowiec. During an excursion undertaken for purposes of instruction to the chief markets of Russian Poland by the representatives of the royal Government at Oppeln (Opole), the representatives of the undersigned Chamber of Commerce and the Miners' and Foundrymen's Association, in the year 1911, it was proved that, in accordance with the account kept by the veterinary office at Sosnowiec,

exactly  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the pigs exported through Sosnowiec into Upper Silesia came from Poland, that is, from the Lublin, Kielce, Radom and Siedlce Governments and that the remaining  $\frac{1}{3}$  came from the western and central governments of Russia. Whilst the fundamental breeding of pigs took place in the larger landed properties in Poland, their fattening was in the hands of the small farmers, who could, when the fattening was finished, which was very easily done, without the help of paid labour, sell their goods at low prices to be sent through Sosnowiec into Upper Silesia. According to the above-mentioned statistics of the Russian veterinary office at Sosnowiec, the Government of Lublin fattened the most pigs for Upper Silesia. It must be expected that, after the war also, there will begin in the above-mentioned places, the breeding and fattening of pigs, advantage being taken of all facilities, and that Upper Silesia will, in the future as hitherto, cover a considerable part of its demand for fat pigs for its population, from Poland. On account of the importance of the question of having a sufficient provision of meat for our industrial district, we make bold, with Your Excellency's permission, to lay special stress upon the absolute necessity of securing the transport of meat from Poland even in case of its not being joined to Germany. Our district is also greatly interested in the regulation of the export of Polish corn in the future. The milling industry formerly flourished in Upper Silesia and it was based, up to the ninth year of the decade, upon a large import of Russian-Polish corn. This was changed when a whole set of mills was built near the Polish frontier, on account of its being made possible to export German corn on the strength of an export permission. These mills took up not only the Polish-Russian corn which up to that time had gone into Upper Silesia, but gradually attracted that corn also which formerly remained in Upper Silesia or which eventually came to Upper Silesia from Germany. The strengthening of the Polish milling industry was also brought about by the conveniences which it obtained on the German bran market. Profiting by the import passes, the mill-owners could purchase German corn at prices lower more or less by the amount of the duty than the home prices. And then they sold their bran on the German markets on account of there being no duty on it, in spite of the fixed prices for German bran, at a great profit in comparison to the prices paid for the corn. In consequence of this the Upper Silesian milling industry declined more and more because of all the corn being transported to the Polish mills. Upper Silesia, flour from which was formerly sent to Saxony and Brandenburg, had now to obtain flour with which to cover its needs from Poznan and from Central Germany. We need not prove that our district is greatly interested in having a milling industry capable of living and supplying it with reasonably cheap flour. Hence we hope that when German-Polish relations are regulated anew, independently of their political formation, German economic interests will be secured. The German mills ought to profit by the Polish corn or at least the harmful competition of the Polish border mills which has hitherto existed, ought to be restrained. Finally we would not pass over in silence the large export from Poland of poultry and eggs, as well as of flax, hemp and forage, which have hitherto been sent into Germany. According to the railway goods' statistics, the export of Polish poultry into Germany amounted in recent years before the war to about half a million head annually. 3,187 tons of hemp and flax were transported into Germany from Poland in 1913 (398 tons of this was for Upper Silesia); 67,000 tons of crushed hemp 24,408 tons of this was for Upper Silesia); 238,731 tons of bran, (30,211 tons of

this was for Upper iSlesia). The maintenance of this relation also ought to be to the interest of the economic life of Germany.

We presume, Your Excellency, that in the above and in the enclosed copy of our memorial we have sufficiently explained the great advantages which may accrue for our district from the future regulation of Polish-German relations. On the basis of these explanations we make bold to ask Your Excellency in case the need should arise before the final regulation of the various economic questions which have to be settled, that our Chamber of Commerce should be once more given the opportunity to express its opinion and to explain its attitude.

(Signed) Williger.

Syndic

(Signed) v. Stoephasius.

**THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE**  
**of the Opole district.**

Katowice, July 1917.

Concerning the Upper Silesian question and the  
future of Poland.

**To**  
**His Excellency Chancellor**  
**von Bethman-Hollweg**  
**Berlin.**

Your Excellency!

In the joint memorial issued by us and by the Mining and Foundry Association in Upper Silesia and entitled: "Economic Relations between Russian Poland and the German Federation and their consequences at the conclusion of peace", dated November 15th, 1915, we expressed the desire that the industries and trade of Upper Silesia should be secured as regards their future relations with the occupied territory of Russian Poland.

Next, in our petition to your Excellency dated September 24th, 1916, (1), a copy of which we take the liberty of enclosing, we set forth in what manner it would be best to regulate in the future the fiscal relations of our country to the above-mentioned territory.

The Upper Silesian Mining and Foundry Association, in its petition dated September 3rd, 1916, also pointed out the necessity of securing the possibility of obtaining certain extremely important raw materials for the Upper Silesian mining industry from Poland. We have the honour to present that petition also for the second time <sup>2)</sup>.

Meanwhile the solution of the Polish question seems to be approaching. It would be very advantageous for Upper Silesian industries if this question were to be regulated in a satisfactory way, and we therefore beg your Excellency, even at the last moment before the decision is made, to allow us to represent to you what wishes of the Upper Silesian mining industry must absolutely be granted.

The importance of Upper Silesian industries not only in the economy of peace but preeminently in the economy of war,—an importance which will become yet greater in the future—is open to no doubt after three years of war. It will not be an exaggeration if we say that it would have been impossible to wage war on account of the considerable demand which existed for manufactured articles belonging to the most various departments of military technique, had not Upper Silesian industries been fully able to help the German nation in meeting the requirements of war.

Thus it is to the very comprehensible interest of the whole state that not only should the Upper Silesian industries be kept alive but that an effort should be made to develop them to their full extent, and hence the Polish question is connected not only with the interests of Upper Silesia but with the interests of the whole of Germany.

In consequence of the inconvenient position of the Upper Silesian industrial district, Poland will continue to be extremely important for its economic development in the future and we may even say that it will be impossible to replace Poland in this respect. Should Poland for a long time not serve the ends of Upper Silesia, then Upper Silesian industries would have to come to a standstill and their value for the restoration and development of the German State would decrease.

At the beginning of May Your Excellency's Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Dr. Helfferich, declared in the Reichstag that the policy of the Central Powers, expressed in their manifest of November 5th, 1916, is probably to-day the only right and possible one and that any other solution of the Polish question would lead to mutual misunderstanding and to undesirable results. This declaration is, in our opinion, most completely in accord with our principles expressed in our memorial of November 1915 as the economic union to Germany in some legal and political form or the other, of interiorly independent Poland, and especially of its south-western border districts, is on principle, the most advantageous solution of the Polish question from a German point of view, as, according to our convictions, we shall most completely and most quickly get at the economic and national wealth of Poland by keeping to the views as to the independence of the Polish nation expressed in the manifest of November 5th, 1916. There is no other way of completely securing the influence of Upper Silesian trade and industry and its expansion in Poland, which would be absolutely necessary in case of its strong development in the future. This is also necessary for the maintenance of commercial relations with Russia, which should in no case through the solution of the Polish question undergo a change for the worse. For this reason we must emphasize here the leading idea that, independently of what the fate of Poland may be, neither Austria nor Austrian influence should ever get in between as and Russia.

Since the publication of our memorials in 1915 and 1916, the interior politics of Russia have undergone a great change. This change has also had its effect on Poland. The opinion of the Poles which, after the victorious entry of our troops, apparently inclined towards the Central Powers, has undoubtedly changed today, in the majority of cases, and is now favourable to Russia, and on account of Polish desires it may be feared that there may be unfriendly relations in the future between Poland and the neighbouring German State. In Germany itself many people are saying that it would be well to change the aims of our foreign policy in regard to Russia, in the direction of coming, if possible, to an understanding with her. Reports show that there is some chance of having a peace founded on mutual understanding with Russia at the price of Poland, that is, at the price of the union of Poland to Germany. Whether this renunciation of Poland for the purpose of coming to a premature understanding with Russia or for other reasons, is necessary, that is more than we know and far be it from us to discuss purely political problems. But there is no need to impress upon Your Excellency that we should greatly regret, from an economic point of view, if the possibility of the industrial development of Upper Silesia should be hazarded, and this possibility has come into existence, as a result of the war and of the projected constitution of Poland in accordance with the declaration of the Emperors of the allied states.

If, however, in these changed circumstances, the question cannot be so settled, we beg Your Excellency, in order that this bloody struggle may be put an end to as soon as possible, to allow us to represent to you what follows:

1) In case the German Federation was obliged to renounce the economic and political union of Poland to itself, then we would insist that in no case should Poland be joined to Austria or made dependant upon that country economically or politically.

In our memorial we have indicated the special reasons which would render the union of Poland to Austria most injurious to the economic interests of Germany. We should not only have to fear that Austria would exploit to the advantage of her own national economic welfare the mineral wealth of Poland and by this means would be in a position to change to her advantage the German-Austrian commercial balance, but that Austria would place the greatest difficulties in the way of the German merchant and industrial in Poland. In addition there comes in here the additional circumstance that German and especially Upper Silesian direct relations with Russia would be rendered quite impossible. And German export to Russia should be quite independent of Austrian influences. As regards this we refer you to our former arguments which are well known to your Excellency, and we only add a petition that you will attach special weight and pay very serious attention to our remarks.

2) We must also declare against Poland remaining a state completely independent of Germany, Austro-Hungary and Russia. In this case not only would Poland be able to place the greatest hindrances in the way of the penetration of German industries but would be besides a brake on German export to Russia. The chief roads for export to Russia lead through Poland and an independent Polish State would have no advantage by arranging the transport for German industrial export or in general by facilitating the transport of German manufactured goods through Poland to Russia. It might most certainly be expected that Poland would do all she could to hinder German industries and commerce.

To secure ourselves against the cramping of our export to Russia we indicated in our former memorials amongst other things the absolute necessity of the German Federation taking exclusive possession of at least the two chief railways for export to Russia, namely the Warsaw-Vienna railway and the Nadwislanska railway through Demblin. In our report of September 4th, 1916, we touched upon the difficulties which would arise in the course of regulating the fiscal question with independent Poland, and we received with gratitude your Excellency's assurance that we shall yet be given the opportunity to defend the interests of our province should the occasion for such a regulation of the fiscal question arise.

3) Should the union of Poland to the economic territory of Germany prove to be impossible, then, since both the leaving Poland under Austrian influence and also her complete independence are excluded, we have come to the conclusion that from the economic point of view in the interests of Germany there remains only one possible solution—to make Poland, even autonomous, in political union with the Russian State, and doing this there should be separated from Poland for strategic reasons a certain zone on the frontier, which, for economic reasons must be united to Germany.

By this solution of the question Germany's direct connection with Russia would be maintained and there would thus be secured the unhindered export of German manufactured goods to Russia. Russia on the other hand would have to bind herself that Russian Poland would place no hindrances in the way of German trade and that the complete liberty of action of the German merchant and of German industries in Poland would be assured, also that German interests should be defended as

well as home interests and that there should be freedom of transport through Poland for German goods.

4) **The economic necessity of the separation from Poland of the districts of Bendzin, Wielun, Czenstochowa and Olkusz and their union to Germany is equally required by strategy.** This, has been as Your Excellency knows, the chief demand of Upper Silesia a long time back.

The amount of coal, lead, iron and zinc contained in that territory is so important for our district that we must always put that point first. As the result of such a union Upper Silesia's supply of the raw materials which are the most indispensable for Germany in peace and war, would considerably increase. These articles have, to be sure, a certain importance for Poland also but they are of course incomparably more important for us and in German hands. And since the coal and iron of these territories would find their chief market as up to the present so in the future, in Poland, we should in this way have in our hands at the time a strong means of bringing economic pressure to bear on Poland either in case Poland was independent state or in case she belonged to Russia. The possession of the Bendzin, Wielun, Czenstochowa and Olkusz districts, which it happens that also strategical necessities require, would bring about the realization of the prospects we have of a successful development of Upper Silesian industries and of national German economic undertakings, as well as of Germany's participation in the economic development of the Near East.

We have already indicated in our memorial, giving detailed reasons and proving the importance of the borders and especially of the Bendzin district for Upper Silesia, that Upper Silesia and Bendzin have long been in the closest economic and cultural union and that the Bendzin district can only be considered as a part of Upper Silesia, economically, geographically and geologically. We should wish here to limit ourselves to repeating to Your Excellency the assertion contained on page 75 of our memorial in the following words:

**The giving over into foreign hands of a district which nature itself decided should be joined to Germany would be in itself a serious mistake. It would however be the more serious if it were to be the cause of the greatest economic loss to Germany.**

**What is true of the Bendzin district is equally true of the Wielun, Czenstochowa and Olkusz districts.**

From the above arguments it results that whatever decision is arrived at with regard to the fate of Poland three conditions must be fulfilled with regard to Upper Silesia.

1) **The frontier of Upper Silesia must be advanced towards the east so that Upper Silesia may be strategically defended.** Those days of the year 1914 when in the neighbourhood of the Upper Silesian mines and foundries artillery thundered, and industry trembled on the verge of destruction, should never more be repeated.

And if the Upper Silesian industries had then been destroyed the German industries would not have supplied the Germans with armament for the further successful conduct of the war.

2) **The extremely important mineral treasures which exist in the frontier strategic zone composed of the Wielun, Czenstochowa, Bendzin and Olkusz districts, must be made useful to the Upper Silesian industries, so as to make them capable to continue their work and to make them capable in the future of fulfilling the re-**

quirements made from them by home defence. For this purpose efforts should be made that the chief industrial properties in this district should pass into German hands.

3) **A market for the products of the Upper Silesian industries**, and especially for the mining industry, should be secured, as well as **general trade with Russia** through a direct and unhindered connection with her so that our industries should have no difficulties to contend with.

With your Excellency's permission we take the liberty to express the hope that the military and political situation will make it possible for us to obtain on the east when peace is concluded all the guarantees which are required by the German nation, so that it may have an unrestrained development in the future. If, however, all these hopes cannot be realized we most humbly beg Your Excellency to consider the above mentioned three requirements of Upper Silesian industry, which are its minimum requirements, so that it might continue to fulfil its duties to its country.

(Signed) **Chairman Williger.**

**Syndic v. Stoephasius.**

## EXCHANGE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FOOD-PRODUCTS BETWEEN UPPER SILESIA AND POLAND (AND BETWEEN UPPER-SILESIA AND GERMANY<sup>1)</sup>)

As an illustration of the commercial condition in Upper Silesia, in the food-supplying department, the sub-joined data are taken from Rose's work, relating to the trade of corn, barley, groats, millet, pease and potatoes (pages: 520, 521, 524, 530, Rose). In these tables the average numbers are given in tons, for the years 1911—1913. (see table N<sup>o</sup> 1).

From the subjoined tables we can obtain the following deduction:

1. **Corn.** The annual import to Silesia from Germany was 13,400 tons and from all the Polish lands 20,000, or one and a half times more.

2. **Barley.** From Germany imported 5,400 tons, and from Poland 13,300 (or nearly two and a half times more). Besides Upper Silesia gave Germany twice as much barley as it received from the Germans.

3. **Millet, groats and pod-plants.** 1,000 tons were annually imported from Germany, and from Poland 9,600 tons—or over nine times as much. The export from Silesia to Germany was three times as great as the import... Altogether, of the above mentioned fruits of the soil the import from Germany, annually was 19,800 tons and from Poland 43,300 tons — or over twice as much.

4. **Potatoes.** Imported from Germany 12,800 tons annually — from Poland 45,500 tons or over 3.5 times more. Upper Silesia exported twice as much potatoes to Germany as it received from Germany.

5. **Swine.** The principal food-article of the Upper Silesian population is pork meat. In this respect Upper Silesia was dependent on the Polish lands—as the sub-joined table (N<sub>o</sub> II) proves (page 536 of Rose's work, during the years 1911, 1913).

The import of swine from the Polish lands is therefor nearly four times as great as that from Germany. The commercial balance of export of swine from Silesia with the Germans is very active, and Silesia exports her own swine (or those imported from abroad) to Germany. The reason for this is as is proved in the (supplement 7 page) data of the Upper-Silesian monograph of the Mining and Metallurgist Association, that the Upper-Silesian swine are lean, whereas the Silesian miners owing to the conditions of their work, must consume a great deal of fat and consequently demand fat swine—such as the Polish lands produce, especially Congress Poland. Swine coming from Congress Poland and Russia are exclusively in demand in Upper Silesia. Their export beyond the frontiers of Upper Silesia was forbidden by a German-Russian convention. (for details see the Upper Silesian memorials of the economical organization sent to the Chancellor Bethman Hollweg — suppl. 8 page 65).

<sup>1)</sup> Tables selected out of Adam Rose's work: „Commercial balance of the former Prussian annexion—lands“ Warsaw 1920 published by the Ministry of Agriculture and State property. This work is based on the official German statistic, namely: „Güterbewegungen auf Deutschen Eisenbahnen“ (1911, 1912, 1913) and „Verkehr und Wasserstände der Deutschen Binnenwasserstrassen“ (1912).

Table No 1.

	C O R N			B A R L E Y			Millet, groats and pod-plants			P O T A T O E S		
	Export	Import	Balance	Export	Import	Balance	Export	Import	Balance	Export	Import	Balance
I. From Germany without the lands now belonging to Poland	3,956	13,417	-9,461	12,549	5,377	-7,172	3,344	1,026	+2,318	25,347	12,844	+12,503
II. From Poznań and West Prussia. .	260	14,783	-14,523	269	331	-62	55	158	-103	1,265	21,682	-20,417
III. From Galicia and Congress Poland	11,349	5,465	+5,884	13	13,013	-13,000	72	9,515	-9,443	871	23,827	-22,956
IV. From abroad, excluding Galicia and Congress Poland . .	334	1,213	-879	1,100	5,593	-4,493	272	2,140	-1,868	7,261	26,015	-18,754
Total . . .	15,899	34,878	-18,979	13,931	24,314	-10,383	3,778	12,846	-9,068	35,747	84,368	-49,621

Table N° 2. SWINE.

D A T A	Export	Import	Balance
1. From Germany, without the lands now belonging to Poland . . . . .	95,434	23,718	+ 71,716
2. From Poznań and West Prussia . . . . .	585	39,275	— 38,690
3. From Galicia and Congress Poland . . . . .	—	54,199	— 54,199
4. From abroad (without Ga- licie and Congrees Poland)	3	40,486	— 40,483
T o t a l	96,022	158,333	— 62,311



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PRINTED BY L. BOGUSŁAWSKI, WARSAW, 11 ŚWIĘTOKRZYSKA.

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